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THE UKRAINIAN GALICIAN ARMY IN THE 
UKRAINIAN-POLISH WAR 1918-1919 



by 

LEONID KONDRATIUK 
B.A., THE CITADEL, 1971 



A MASTER'S THESIS 



submitted in partial fulfillment of the 



requirements for the degree 



MASTER OF ARTS 



Department of History 



KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY 
Manhattan, Kansas 

1979 



Approved by: 



Maj^r Professor 





5p 

LD 

Ms 

? 



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 



11 



Chapter Page 

I. INTRODUCTION 1 

II. EASTERN GALICIA-WESTERN UKRAINE 5 

The Ukrainian Cultural and Political Awakening 5 

Eastern Galicia and World War I . 14 

III. INITIAL STAGES OF THE WAR 25 

The Coup d'Etat in Lviv 25 

The Final Phase for Lviv 34 

The Battle for Peremyshl and the Frontier 35 

The Battle for Lviv 38 

The 1919 Winter Campaign 43 

IV. ORGANIZATION, DIPLOMACY, AND DEFEAT 55 

Organization of UHA 55 

The Diplomatic Front 69 

The Final Military Effort 7 5 

V. CONCLUSION 88 



APPENDIX 92 

FOOTNOTES 98 

BIBLIOGRAPHY Ill 

A3 STRACT 



ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 

I would like to thank my committee members for their help and 
encouragement; Dr. Jacob Kipp, Dr. Robin Higham, and Dr. George Kren. 
I owe a great deal of thanks to Dr. Kipp, my major professor, for his 
advice, suggestions, and invaluable criticism. 

Dr. Michael Palij , University of Kansas Library, provided 
assistance in obtaining materials as did the Inter-Library Loan Depart- 
ment, Kansas State University Library. 

I owe an irrepayable debt to my wife, Neonilia M. Kcndratiuk, 
for her constant interest and encouragement and for this I dedicate 
my work to her. 

I have used a modified Library of Congress system of translitera- 
tion but without diacritical marks and ligatures as used by Voldymyr 
Kucijovyc, (ed,), Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia , (Toronto, 1963-1971). 
Names of cities and towns are transliterations from Ukrainian; hence, 
Lviv, rather than Lwow, Lvov, or Lemberg. 



11 



CHAPTER I 



INTRODUCTION 



With the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in October 1918 
five states emerged: Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and 
Western Ukraine. The last, Western Ukraine, had never been a separate 
country, a former Polish province, it was historically part of the Ukraine 

In spite of its name, the Western Ukrainian Republic consisted 
primarily of Eastern Galicia. The Ukrainian majority, ruled for years 
by the Polish minority, took advantage of the confusion created by the 
fall of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to proclaim their independence in 
October 1918, but Poles, both within and without the country, saw Eastern 
Galicia as a historic and integral part of Poland. The inevitable 
result was an armed conflict. 

The Ukrainian-Polish War of 1913-1919 was fcughc by two nationali- 
ties that had coexisted, albeit with political friction, for centuries. 
However, there was an element of social conflict as well; the landowners 
and civil servants were primarily Poles, the Ukrainians, with a small 
middle class, were peasants. Yet the war was free of ethnic and social 
antimosity. The soldiers of both armies, former peasants themselvs, 
often mingled between the fighting. 

The Ukrainians saw the conflict as a war of national liberation. 
They believed in the principle of self-determination and were surprised 

1 



2 
by the attitude of the Poles. Both sides, convinced of the Tightness 
of their positions, sought diplomatic recognition from the Paris Peace 
Conference. 

The latter initially viewed the conflict as a border dispute. 
However, the war took on greater significance when the Conference grew 
alarmed over events in Russia. Although the Allied Powers attempted to 
mediate the dispute, events on the battlefield determined the outcome 
of this conflict. 

For the Allies the Eastern Galician question was but a part of 
the larger issue of containing Bolshevism. As the Ukrainian hold on 
Eastern Galicia became more precarious, the Poles magnified the Bolshevik- 
menace to their own advantage. Convinced that the Poles had to be 
supported in their burgeoning fight against the Bolshevius, the Allies 
quickly dismissed Ukrainian aspirations and authorized the Poles to occupy 
all of Eastern Galicia. 

Historians have studied the diplomatic aspects of the Ukrainian- 
Polish conflict but the role of the Ukrainsha Halytska Armiia (Ukrainian 
Galician Army or UHA) remains largely untold. The UHA composed of veterans 
of the Austrian Army grew into a sizeable well disciplined organized 
armed force. Led by officers drawn from the small Ukrainian intelligentsia, 
the army saw the war as a national crusade for the self-determination of 
Western Ukraine. 

The Ukrainian-Polish war is an interesting study of the fate of 
post-war minority armed forces in a state of flux between major powers 
and their allies. The Poles, initially supported by the French, wen the 
eventual support of the Allies. The Ukrainians, with a past largely 
unknown by the West, never had any real diplomatic support. In wars of 



3 
national liberation the minority cannot succeed without outside assistance 
and great power recognition. The Ukrainian-Polish war is an excellent 
case study. 



CHAPTER II 
EASTERN GALI CIA-WESTERN UKRAINE 

The Ukrainian Cultural and Political Awakening . 

In order to place the Ukrainian-Polish conflict over Eastern 
Galicia and the role of the Ukrainian Galician Army in proper perspective, 
it is appropriate to outline briefly the character of Ukrainian-Polish 
relations prior to World War I. 

Eastern Galicia (roughly the size of West Virginia) was one of 
the three West Ukrainian provinces that were formerly part of Austro- 
Hungary. Once part of the Kievan principality, it had been independent 
in medieval times. Absorbed by the Poles during the fourteenth century, 
it remained part of Poland until the first partition in 1772 when it was 
taken by Austria and joined with adjacent Polish territory to form the 
Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria, commonly known as Galicia. 

The majority of the population were Ukrainian peasants known 
as Rusyny (Ruthenians) , a name derived from the medieval term for the 
Ukraine, Rus . The landed gentry was completely Polish, while the 
inhabitants of the cities and towns were Poles and Jews. The educated 
Ukrainians were primarily Uniate (Greek Catholic) priests, The initial 
result of the partition proved to be beneficial to Ukrainians. The Uniate 
Church was granted equal status with the Roman Catholic Church. The 
Habsburg kings also opened new Uniate seminaries, created a Ukrainian 
chair of philosophy and theology at Lviv University, and facilitated church 

5 



6 

administration by establishing cathedral chapters headed by bishops. 
These reforms raised the educational and cultural standards of the 

Ukrainian clergy, and led to their assumption of the political and cultural 

2 
leadership of the Ukrainian community. 

Although the reforms ended with Emperor Joseph II' s death in 1790, 

the life of the Ukrainian serf had improved; minor personal rights, such 

as marriage, and the right to appeal to governmental offices, were granted; 

peasants were given possession of cultivated plots, while the corvee was 

limited to 156 days per year. The end of the Napoleonic Wars turned the 

policies of the Austrian government toward the interests of the Polish 

landed gentry; however, by then the Ukrainian peasant had become a legal 

3 

entity rather then a form of chattel . 

Though in the late 1820 's and early 1830' s, the older Uniate 
clergy were conservative, the younger clergymen came under the influence 
of the Romantic movement. In 1832 a patriotic circle was formed in the 

Lviv Seminary, the leaders known as the Ruthenian Triad; were Markian 

4 
Shashkevych, Ivan Vehylevych, and Jacob Holovatsky. In 1837 they published 

Rusalka Dnistrovaia (The Nymph of the Dniester) , a volume of folk and 

original poetry in the Ukrainian language. This created an uproar among 

church authorities. Until that time, Ukrainian was spoken only by 

peasants, Uniate services were conducted in Old Church Slavonic, while the 

spoken language among the literate classes was Polish. Shashkevych was 

stimulated by the vernacular literary movement in Eastern Ukraine, while 

Vehylevych and Holovatsky were influenced by the ideas of the Czech national 

movement. In an article published in 1846 Holovatsky appealed to Austrians 

to support the Galician Ukrainians, who would influence "those living in 

the Russian Empire." The Ukrainian national revival in Galicia now passed 



from "the literary to the political field." 

While the Ukrainian revival was just beginning, the attempts by 
Polish patriots to regain Poland's independence had never ended. In 1846 
Polish revolutionaries attempted to foment a rebellion among the Polish 
peasantry in Western Galicia. Instead the peasants, encouraged by rumors 
of reform from Vienna, turned on the revolutionaries and nobility in a 
bloody jacquerie. Eastern Galicia remained quiet. In 1847 the Eastern 
and Western sections of the province were divided into two administrative 
districts, a move long awaited by Ukrainians. 

In May 1848, the first Ukrainian political organization in Galicia, 
the Holovna Ruska Rada (Central Ruthenian Council) , was established under 
the leadership of Bishop Yakhymovych. The Council declared that Ukrainians 
were a distinct people different from the Poles and Russians. The Council 
also called for the partition of Galicia into Ukrainian and Polish provinces. 

The Regolutions of 1848 also affected Galicia. When news of 
outbursts in Vienna reached Galicia, Polish activists staged large-scale 
demonstrations that demanded greater autonomy for the province. The 
politically conscious Ukrainians, realizing that the Polish demand for 
autonomy would place the government of che province in Polish control, 
petitioned for equal rights for both nationalities. 

The Austrian governor of Galicia, Count Francis Stadion, encouraged 

the Central Ruthenian Council in its national claims in an attempt to thwart 

9 
the irredentism of the Polish gentry and intelligentsia. He also abolished 

the corvee, thus causing both Polish and Ukrainian peasants to support the 

regime. In March 1949, permission was granted for a provisional regiment 

of "Ruthenian Riflemen" formed with Ukrainian peasant volunteers to aid 



8 
the hardpressed Austrian Army in suppressing the rebellion in Hungary. 

During the Slav Congress in Prague the Czechs acted as mediators 
between the Poles and Ukrainians on the Polish-Ruthenian Council. The 
Ukrainians agreed to postpone the issue of dividing Galicia, while the Poles 
agreed that both groups "were to have equal rights in all administrative 
and educational matters." Although this resolution never came into 
being, because cf the forced dissolution of the Slav Congress, this was 

the only time that Ukrainian and Polish representatives compromised until 

1 n 
1914. 

In 1349, Count Agenor Goluchowski, a Pole, was appointed provincial 

governor. He opposed any reforms that would benefit the nascent Ukrainian 

movement. Goluchowski denounced the Ukrainians as dangerous Russophiles, 

and further implied that they were disloyal toward Austria. And though 

his attempt to Latinize the Ukrainian alphabet failed, he was successful 

13 
in replacing Germans with Poles in the Galician civil service. 

During the 1850 's the Ukrainian movement split into two factions; 

the Russophiles, or Old Ruthenians, made up of older intelligentsia, who 

looked forward to union with Russia, and the Narodova (Populists) , or 

Young Ruthenians later the "Ukrainians", who saw a worsening of the Ukrainian 

14 
national situation. The Russophiles, politically and culturally more 

powerful, made little effort to compromise with the Poles. Polish authori- 
ties, suspecting a Russophile collusion with Russian agents alerted Vienna 
with their suspicions. The Russophiles, who thought of themselves as 
Russians rather than Ukrainians, could not provide the leadership that was 
needed to nurture the growing Ukrainian political movement. 

The Populists, many of them members of the rising lay intelligentsia, 
concentrated on educational and cultural work, especially, among the peasants. 



Politically weak, the Populists organized secret student groups and also 

1 f\ 
published Ukrainian books and newspapers. 

During the latter half of the nineteenth centry, Polish-Ukrainian 
bitterness intensified. The Poles considered Eastern Galicia part of 
historic Poland. The Ukrainians, who saw themselves as second class 
citizens in their own country, believed that Poland should be composed 
solely of ethnic Poles. The Poles were in the dominant position; in 1867 
Vienna turned over the administration of Galicia to the Polish aristocracy 
and Polish became the official language. Galicia was now a de facto Polish 
autonomous province. 

The two groups were also separated socially; Poles dominated the 
landed nobility and upper middle class, while the Ukrainians, with a small 
middle class, were predominately peasants. The Ukrainian intelligentsia, 
whose origins were only one or two generations removed from the village, 
remained a very small element of Ukrainian society. Thus the Ukrainian 
struggle was national as well as socia_L. 

Most Poles thought the idea of a nation composed of Ukrainians 
with rights equal to those of Poles as ridiculous. Poles who often called 
the Ukrainian movement an Austrian or Russian intrigue also controlled the 
Galician Diet and heavily outnumbered the Ukrainian representatives in the 
Viennese parliament. In 1873 when the curia system of election was 
introduced, the percentage of Ukrainian delegates dropped drastically from 
33% to 10%. 18 

Meanwhile, the Populists increased in number and influence. Many 
Russophiles joined the Populists after their own leaders were discredited 

in an 1882 court trial where their duplicity, in professing loyalty to 

19 
Vienna while accepting Russian payments, was uncovered. By 1890 the 



10 
Populists had assumed the leadership of the Ukrainian community. 

The Galician Ukrainians were also in close contact with the Russian- 
controlled Dnieper Ukrainians- Galicia became a "sanctuary from tsarist 
persecution." Since Ukrainian cultural and educational activities were 
prohibited in Dnieper Ukraine from 1876-1906, Galicia became a Ukrainian 
"Piedmont". This "Piedmont complex" convinced many Galician Ukrainians 
that Eastern Galicia would play the leading role in the Ukraine's struggle 
for independence. 

Between 1890 and 1914 the Ukrainians in Galicia made great 
strides politically, economically, and culturally. Ivan Rudnyrsky, an 
American-Ukrainian scholar, called it a time of tremendous change. "In 

the place of a depressed peasant mass arose a politically conscious peasant 

22 
nation. " 

Between 1890 and 1894 efforts to effect a political compromise 

between Poles and Ukrainians failed. But from these activities two new 

Ukrainian political parties emerged; the Ruthenian-Ukrainian Radical Party 

and the Ukrainian National Democratic Party. The Radicals maintained a 

policy of agrarian socialism and militant anticlericalism. The National 

Democrats, a coalition party, had a common platform of democratic nationalism 

and social reform. Both parties advocated future independence for a unified 

23 

Ukraine. 

The number of Ukrainian schools and libraries increased by hundreds. 
In 1894 Mykhailo Hrushevsky, a young Ukrainian professor from Kiev, was 
appointed to the chair of East European History at the University of Lviv . 
While writing the ten volume History of Ukraine he also presided over the 
Shevchenko Scientific Society raising it to the levex of an unofficial 
Ukrainian academy of arts and sciences. 



11 

Two gymnastic societies Sokil (Falcon) and Sich (named for the 
Cossack fortress of the 16th-18th centuries) combined physical education 
with the promotion of patriotic and cultural interests. Both groups 
sponsored reading halls, choirs, libraries, theater groups, and educational 
courses that spread national sentiment and consciousness among Ukrainian 
youth. 

However, the status of the peasantry remained unimproved. Agricul- 
tural production remained low, the peasants still using primitive implements, 
In the agricultural areas of Eastern Galicia there were 182 people per 
square mile, such population pressure resulted in an average of 50,000 
people dying a year from malnutrition. Over 40% of the farmland was still 
in latifunda. 

A bright side, however, was the growing number of Ukrainian 
immigrants to America and Canada who were able to send money to their 
families in Galicia. This relief of population pressure and return of 
capital resulted in some peasant families purchasing parcels of land. Also 
during this period, the cooperative movement aided peasants in purchasing 
land, establishing credit unions, cooperative stores and dairies, as well 
as forming agricultural marketing associations. The Silskyi Hospodar 

(Village Farmer) , a national peasant agricultural organization, gave advice 

26 
on improving farming methods. 

A general agrarian strike in 1902, involving some 200,000 peasants, 

was a protest against the low wages paid by the Polish nobles as well as 

against the bureaucratic hindrance in the issuing of seasonal emigration 

work permits. The strike, because of its adherence, proved a success as 

27 
wages were increased and seasonal emigration became easier. The general 



12 
strike was by no means an isolated event. 

The period just before World War I was also marked by political 
rallies, demonstrations, and riots which often resulted in arrests and 
trials. In 1908 a hotheaded Ukrainian student assassinated the Polish 
governor, Count Andrzej Potocki, in retaliation for the deaths of two 
peasants during a dispute over a fraudulent election. 

The major political issues involved educational and electoral 
reform. Ukrainians wanted to open a new university in Lviv, after the 
Polish dominated administration of the University of Lviv refused to create 
additional Ukrainian chairs. Clashes between Polish and Ukrainian students 
over this issue culminated in the death of one and the mass resignation of 
600 other Ukrainian students. In 1912 the Austrian government promised 

to establish a Ukrainian university in four years, but even this was 

28 
obstructed by the Poles. Limited electoral reform was achieved in 1907 

with universal suffrage instituted in Galicia. Although Ukrainian represen- 
tation doubled, che gerrymandering of electoral districts maintained Polish 

29 
predominance in the Galician delegation to the Reichstrat in Vienna. 

On the eve of the outbreak of World War I there was a glimmer of 

hope for political reconciliation. After a series of political battles, 

both Poles and Ukrainians agreed to compromise in the revision of the 

electoral laws for the Galician Diet. On February 14, L914, the reform 

bill was passed; Ukrainians now had 62 of the 228 seats. Ukrainians were 

also appointed to provincial boards and diet committees, and were given 

30 
control of their own school system. In return, the Ukrainians agreed 

that in rural districts, where Poles were a minority, non-Ukrainians would 

be entitled to proportional representation. Although Ukrainians had won 



13 
important concessions, they still were not satisfied with their political 
status. Many Ukrainians felt that the only answer was an autonomous 
Ukrainian crownland within the empire, and then eventual independence. 
Overall, Ukrainians remained loyal to the Emperor, while the government 
began distrusting the Poles. 

Little was said about the status of the 38% of the population 
that w s non-Ukrainian. In the last prewar census (1910) Eastern Galicia 
had 5,335,800 people divided into 61% Ukrainians, 25.3% Poles, and 12.4% 

t 31 

Jews . 

The outbreak of World War I seriously hampered Ukrainian efforts 
toward greater political autonomy. There had been a growing trend toward 
political compromise between Poles and Ukrainians. It was evident that 
a reborn Poland was in sight and that the Ukrainians could be harmonious 
neighbors. The earlier viciousness between Polish and Ukrainian politicians 
had also lessened; both groups felt that differences could be worked out 
amiably. 

The Poles also realized that the Ukrainians had matured into a 
political force and could not be assimiliated or knuckled down.. However, 
the war reopened healed sores. 

To many prominent Poles in Eastern Galicia Austro-Hungary was the 
enemy. Only with its defeat could Poland emerge again. The Ukrainians, 
perhaps with less political acumen, remained loyal to the Emperor. They 
felt that political autonomy was in sight, and possibly, in ten or twenty 
years, independence. Ukrainians did not want to jeopardize their newly 
won political rights. As a result., the Poles and Ukrainians once more 
became adversaries, and their political antagonisms resumed. 



14 
Eastern Galicia and World War I . 

It was evident to some Ukrainians that war between Austrc- 
Hungary and Russia was inevitable. In December 1912, representatives 
of Ukrainian political parties decided, thinking of a future united 
Ukrainian nation, that in case of war, "the entire Ukrainian people will 

unanimously and resolutely stand on the side of Austria against the Russian 

, 32 

empire, as the greatest enemy of the Ukraine.'' 

In reality, the Ukrainians had little choice in their support of 

Austria, as any indications of nonsupport or passivity would have resulted 

33 
in the Galician Poles labeling them as traitors. Nevertheless, Ukrainian 

support for Austro-Hungary remained firm. 

On August 3, 1914, the newly formed Holovna Ukrainska Rada 

(Central Ukrainian Council) composed of representatives of the three 

largest political parties, called for the Ukrainian people to stand united 

against the Tsarist empire. The Council also ordered the unofficial 

Ukrainska Boiova Uprava (Ukrainian Military Administration) to start 

34 
organizing volunteer units tor service at the front. The following 

day in Lviv, the Soiuz Vyzvolennia Ukrainy (Union for the Liberation of 
Ukraine) was formed as a political organization of East Ukrainians determined 
to take advantage of the war to promote the idea of an independent Ukraine. 

During the Fall of 1914, with the collapse of Austrian defenses, 
some Poles denounced local Ukrainians as a potential fifth column full 
of Russian agents. Retreating Hungarian units arbitrarily executed 2,000 
priests, peasants, and members of the intelligentsia. Over 10,000 Ukrain- 
ians were imprisoned in Austrian concentration camps and were not released 
until 1917. 3? 



15 
As Ukrainian deputies in Vienna attempted to convince the Austro- 

Hungarian High Command of the atrocities its units had committed, Tsarist 

38 
occupation officials instituted their own repressive regime. The Tsarist 

government attempted to Russify the Uniate Church by replacing the deported 

Ukrainian priests with Russian Orthodox priests. Ukrainian cultural and 

educational institutions were closed and prominent Ukrainians, such as 

Metropolitan Count Andreij Sheptysky, were exiled to Siberia. While visiting 

Lviv, Tsar Nicholas II, calling the population "truly Russian," proclaimed 

39 

the union of Galicia with Russia. During the Russian retreat in June 

1915, thousands of peasants were forced by the Russian Army to evacuate, 
many of them dying from hunger and disease. 

Ukrainian political leaders in Vienna led by Konstantin Levytsky, 
Evhen Olenytsky, and Nykola Vasylko worked to improve conditions and 
resolve political problems of Eastern Galicia. In May 1915, the Zahalna 
Ukrainska Rada (General Ukrainian Council) , made up of Western and Eastern 
Ukrainians was formed to work for the independence of Eastern Ukraine 

from Russia and for the political autonomy of Western Ukraine within the 

40 

Austro-Hungarian Empire. The General Council also requested that units 

of the Ukrainian Sich Rifles replace Polish troops in occupation duties 

in conquired areas of Russian Ukraine. Even though the request was denied, 

41 
Ukrainian officers organized cultural and educational groups in Volhynia. 

The General Council also organized relief and protection efforts for the 

war-ravaged areas of Eastern Galicia. 

In November 1916, Germany and Austria jointly proclaimed an 

independent Poland made up of the former Russian gubernias and Galicia. 

Ukrainian members of parliament, led by Evhen Petrushevych, vigorously 

protested that the Ukrainian people would never relinquish their fight for 



16 
political autonomy. The new Austro-Hungarian emperor, Charles I, assured 
the Ukrainians that the Galician question would be resolved after the 

end of the war. However, the Ukrainian delegates demanded a settlement 

42 
as soon as possible. With the outbreak of the Russian Revolution in 

March 1917, Eastern Ukraine declared itself an independent Peoples Republic 

headed by Professor Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the Central Rada . As a result, 

aspirations for an independent Western (Galician) Ukrainian state, which 

had always been an idealistic dream, was now a viable alternative to 

Austrian refusals of an autonomous crownland . Ukrainian students urged 

the Ukrainian parliamentary delegation to declare its intention to form a 

43 
Republic from the Ukrainian provinces of Austro-Hungary . 

The Ukrainian parliamentary delegates chose to continue to strive 

for autonomy within the Austrian state. Evhen Petrushevych, in an address 

to parliament in May 1917, declared that Ukrainian lands could not be merged 

44 
with Poland. However, it was not until February 1918 that the Ukrainian 

delegates, in a speech made by Konstantin Levytsky, threatened that if 

the separation of Galicia into Polish and Ukrainian divisions was not 

accomplished, then preparations would be made to unite with the Ukrainian 

45 
People's Republic. A secret organization of Ukrainian officers in Vienna 

was formed to plan the unification of Ukraine, while Ukrainian students now 

46 
called for a unified Ukraine under the rule of the Central Rada . 

The Central Rada was also interested in unifying Eastern and Western 

Ukraine. In February 1918 at Brest-Litovsk, where German, Austrian, 

Bolshevik, and Ukrainian delegations attempted to negotiate the end of 

hostilities, the Central Rada attempted to force Austria into seceding its 

Western Ukrainian provinces to the Ukrainian Republic. Count Ottokar 

Czernin, the Austrian foreign minister, though desperate for Ukrainian 



17 
grain, refused to consider this demand. However, a secret supplement to 

the treaty was signed whereby Eastern Galicia and Northern Bukovina were 

47 
to be joined in an Austrian crownland. 

The secret provisions of the treaty were divulged by a Ukrainian 

diplomat to Galician Ukrainian politicians in Vienna, Polish delegates, 

when informed of the treaty's secret provisions, protested the separation 

of Galicia especially since the proposed Ukrainian capital, Lviv, was 

48 
essentially a Polish city. 

To further complicate matters, the Germans engineered a coup d 'etat 

in the Ukraine in April 1918. General Pavlo Skoropadsky proclaimed himself 

Hetman (an old title for the leader of the Ukrainian Cossacks) , overthrew 

49 
the Central Rada and established a new government in Kiev. The Austrian 

government, under Polish pressure, accused the Ukrainians of violating the 

grain delivery terms of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. This gave the Austrian 

government the opportunity to renounce the secret agreement in regard to 

Galicia, calling it an internal matter. The Hetman, dependent upon German 

49 
occupation troops for his survival, was rorced to acquiesce. Ukrainian 

protests in Vienna proved ineffective. 

On October 16, 1918, Charles I, with his empire about to collapse, 
announced a manifesto that would reconstruct Austria into a federation of 
German, Czech, and Ukrainian states. However, at a meeting in Lviv, Ukrain- 
ian parliamentary delegates, representatives of political parties and 
several Uniate bishops convened themselvs, on October 19, as the Ukrainska 
Narodna Rada (Ukrainian People's Council). The latter hastily passed a 
statute of five articles which included plans for an independent Western- 
Ukrainian State composed of Eastern Galicia, Northwestern Bukovina, and 
Carpatho-Ukraine. On the next day, October 20, the Council proclaimed 



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19 
the Western Ukrainian People's Republic an independent state. 

The Council expected a peaceful transition from an Austro-Hungarian 
province to an independent country. Noticeably absent from the deliberations 
were army officers; they were not invited, naively, because the Council 
thought their presence as unnecessary. There was little thought that, 
perhaps, Western Ukraine would have to maintain its independence with the 
force of arms. In the glow of political victory, after years of struggle, 
there was little thought that Ukrainian independence would be opposed; the 
Austro-Hungarian armies had collapsed, Germany was on the verge of defeat, 
Russia's attention was diverted by internal problems, while the Poles 
were busy organizing their own government and country. 

As a result, the Council did not plan for the military take-over 
of Eastern Galicia. Only a few politicians realized that some military 
force would be needed. Others felt that the Austrian military authorities 
would simply transfer their authority and march out of Eastern Galicia. 
The few Ukrainian officers of the Austro-Hungarian Army in Galicia, joined 
together in the secret Central Military Committee, also thought that a 
minimum of military force would be needed. 

Ukrainian officers gave little thought toward the formation of an 
army and even less toward the possibility of armed resistance or war with 
Poland. Consequently, few preparations were made to defend the interests 
of the Council by forming a nucleus of an army. 

Meanwhile the future core of the Ukrainian Galician Army, Ukrainian 
veterans of the Austrian Army, rapidly demobilized and began returning to 
their villages. Few efforts were made to stop them. The situation was 
indictative of the attitude of the Ukrainian intelligentsia toward the 
military. 



20 

There had been a dichotomy toward military service among Ukrainians. 
To the peasants, although it was an additional burden, military service 
was accepted and complied with. To the middle class, it was something to 
be avoided. 

Ever since the adoption of universal military service in 1868, 
among the peasants, service in the army had become a tradition in many areas 
of the Ukrainian provinces. It was not unusual to have three generations 
serving in the same regiment. Ukrainians usually served in regiments 
composed of two or more nationalities, most often with Poles and Polish 
officers. Several regiments were completely Ukrainian except for the 
officers and higher ranking sergeants who were usually German. Yet 
Ukrainians made up only 8.6% of the enlisted strength of the peacetime 

Austro-Hungarian Army. In early 1914 there were 25,000 Ukrainians 

52 
serving in 42 regiments. Of the 6,500,000 men who served in the Austro- 

Hungarian Army during World War I, over 500,000 were Ukrainians. 

While there was a tradition of enlisted service in the army, there 
were extremely few Ukrainian officers. There were three reasons for the 
small number of Ukrainian officers: (1) the primary one was that the 
Ukrainian middle class was so small, there were few Ukrainians eligible 
to receive commissions; (2) Ukrainian students, who were more interested 
in civilian professions, had a definite aversion to serving in the feudal- 
aristocratic Austrian officer corps; (3) official policy was to favor the 
recruitment of officers from the socially and educationally privileged 

nationalities. Germans, who made up 24% of the population, composed 79% 

54 

of the regular officer corps, and 59% of the reserve officer corps. 

In spite of this, several Ukrainians did serve as regular officers, 
while a larger number served in the reserves where they remained first 



21 
lieutenants as it was not until 1916 that reserve and temporary officers 
could be promoted to the grade of captain. During World War I several 
thousand Ukrainians were commissioned, the vast majority serving as 
lieutenants and captains. Few Ukrainians achieved field grade while only 
four became generals. 

The most famous Ukrainian regiment in the Austrian Army was the 
Ukrainski Sichovi Striltsi (Ukrainian Sich Rifles) . In August 1914, the 
Supreme Ukrainian Council called on Ukrainians to volunteer for a legion 
of division size for war service. Although 28,000 men volunteered, because 
of Polish pressure the Austrians limited the unit to a regiment of 
2,500 men. The nucleus of the regiment was the Sichovi Striltsi , a 
paramilitary organization, formed in 1913. The Ukrainian Sich Rifles was 
formed with the idea that it would be the foundation of a future Ukrainian 
Army. The politically conscious volunteers, mostly students, strongly 
supported the idea of an independent Western Ukraine. 

Except for several Austrian officers, the entire regiment was 
Ukrainian; composed of two infantry battalions, a cavalry troop (disbanded 

in 1917), and a regimental depot. It was first committed to ccmbat in 

58 
September 1914 against Russian troops in the Carpathian Mountains. The 

regiment saw heavy fighting on the Eastern Front and distinguished itself 

in the Battle of Makivka in May 1915. But after it suffered heavy losses 

in the Battle of Berezhany in September 1916, it was reorganized into one 

battalion. In early 1918, the Sich Rifles was serving with an independent 

Landsturm Brigade in Bessarabia; in the Fall the battalion was transferred 

to Bukovma . 

Perhaps, the regiment's two greatest contributions to the future 

Ukrainian Galician Army was the number of commissioned officers it produced, 



22 
and the nationalistic spirit that these officers inspired among the soldiers. 
This spirit would be severely tested. 

Both the National Council and the Central Military Committee 
blithely looked forward co Ukrainian independence. They believed that the 
years of political strife had finally paid off. The Western Ukrainians 
were entitled to independence and were ready for it, or so they believed. 

The vast majority of Ukrainians, the peasants, were not fully 
politically conscious for after years of serving the Emperor, the events 
during and after the war confused them. To the peasants an independent 
Ukraine was something hard to imagine. Many peasants were illiterate and, 
therefore, could not read about events in Lviv and Vienna. The idea of 
being a Ukrainian rather than a Ruthenian was fairly recent and had not 
taken hold in all of Eastern Galicia. Therefore, it would take months 
before the peasants would appreciate the full meaning of nationhood. 

Little was done to form an army that would depend on peasant 
soldiers. Many of the demobilized peasant veterans returned to their 
villages. Instead of propagandizing and assembling the veterans, 
battalions were allowed to drift away. Other Ukrainian officers and 
soldiers were still stationed on the Italian front or were POW's. The 
one regiment thac could have served as a nucleus of an army, the Sich 
Rifles, was sitting in Bukovina, 230 kilometers from Lviv, while seme of 
its members were involved in political affairs to the exclusion of military 
matters . 

Therefore, the Ukrainian political and military leadership did 
not realize their tenuous position. They ignored the fact that 33% of the 
country was non-Ukrainian and that the ?o].es would resist a Ukrainian 
government. Many Poles fully expected Eastern Galicia to be incorporated 



24 
into Poland. The Polish National League saw Eastern Galicia and the 
Ukrainians as an integral part of Poland. The war had proved that compromise 
between the Poles and Ukrainians was now out of the question. All factors 
pointed toward armed conflict, yet, when it occurred, both sides were 
surprised . 



CHAPTER III 

INITIAL STAGES OF THE WAR 

The Coup d'Etat in Lviv 

During the latter part of October 1918, the Ukrainian People's 

* 

Council started negotiations with the Austrian governor, Count Von Huyn, 
for the take over of the administration of Eastern Galicia. The Council, 
faced with Von Huyn's refusal to transfer governmental authority, now 
sanctioned a coup d'etat . 

The Central Military Committee had been planning for a coup for 
several weeks. On October 30 Captain Dmytro Vitovsky of the Sich Rifles 
arrived in Lviv, assumed leadership of the plotters, and decided that the 
coup would take place during the night of October 31. That evening 

Captain Vitovsky issued orders for the disposition of the 1,400 Ukrainian 

2 
soldiers of the 10th, 30th, 33rd, 58th, and 89th Infantry Regiments. 

Eight hundred men took over the barracks and public buildings, and disarmed 

non-Ukrainian troops. The remainder (plans for an additional 1,000 men 

4 
had fallen through) were either held in reserve or guarded supply depots. 

On the morning of November 1 the city awoke to find the blue 

and yellow Ukrainian flag flying in place of the Austro-Hungarian national 

colors, while Ukrainian troops, still in Austrian uniforms, but distinguished 

by blue and yellow arm and hatbands, held Lviv. Governor Von Huyn, now 

under house arrest, still refused to transfer his powers but later agreed 

to hand over his authority to his Ukrainian deputy, Volodymyr Detsikevich, 

25 



26 



THE MAIN STREETS AND IMPORTAN 



LEGEND 

i>0. -PoitOffici 

1 . - Church of Vary Msgaa'^ne 

2. - Jesuit Church 

3 . - Dominican Church 
4.- WallaChiaA Church 
5.-3oimi Chape' 

6. - CdVieara! 



Z*Wft;jfYNOW 





/BUILDINGS 



Hospital 



Jewish TtfiNJ. / 
luart»r Oil 9 
TOWN 
Theatre Armenian -, 



H:il S^LuKin Union Mqufli 

/ 



I The Centra 



r«.rdinana ,-<N ..r^ "'■ CatMdral \( 



V^- hurcn School" 




.^f 



^\ r**« iernari.n C.ttit eft 



Leo Scpieta Sir. 

NEW^TTOWN ^ 

^£ T echniciars 
^K.loitel 



'V V 

#X Dssslimum '\ ■ Studentj'^aitel 
"~> \ %MZ~Rw*iiowici Sir. 

^<SJ /t.todel CvC 




^i .dSBris,^ 



i** -^ tyewk 
"C^L Cemetwy / 



idets=ho>s,'' st ^ s "' ? 




3arracks 



SarracKs 



SCALE 

STATUTE MILE 

ft 



Lviv in 1918 from Rosa Bailly, A City Fights for 
Freedom: The Rising of Lwow in 1918-1919 , London, 
1956. 



27 
who promptly signed the documents that turned over the government to the 
Ukrainian People's Council. On the same day the Council issued a 
proclamation announcing the transfer of power to the Western Ukrainian 
Republic. A second proclamation to the city of Lviv called for peace 
and order . 

Although the extent of Austro-Ukrainian collaboration in the coup 
is unclear, Polish historians claim that the local authorities and the 
Austrian High Command aided preparations, while Ukrainian historians deny 
any prior Austrian assistance. However, General Rudolf Pfeffer, the Austrian 
garrison commander, clearly sided with the Ukrainians. In an address to 
his officers, he urged them to volunteer for service in the Ukrainian 
Galician Army (UHA) . 

However, the Polish population (which consisted of over half of 

o 

the 206,000 people) had no intention of living in a Ukrainian state. They 
had expected Eastern Galicia to be formally annexed to Poland by the 
Polish Liquidation Commission which was to have arrived on November 1. 

As word of the preparations for the coup leaked out, the secret Polish 

9 
military organizations met on October 31 to discuss their strategy. 

The three recently organized military groups; the POW (Polish 

Military Organization) supporters of Jozef Pilsudski, the PKW (Polish 

Military Cadre) the military arm of the National Democratic Party, and 

the PKP (Polish Auxiliary Corps) made up of former Polish Legionnaires 

who had broken with Pilsudski, laid aside their political differences and 

agreed to the leadership of Captain Czeslaw Maczynski. Although their 

entire armament consisted of only 64 rifles, the Poles decided to strike 

back on the afternoon of November 1. On that busy day, they occupied 

the Sienkiewicz School, an army barracks, and the Technical Hall which 



28 

12 
became their headquarters. Polish soldiers were reinforced by students, 

workers, and several women. Ukrainian troops, sent to dislodge the Poles, 

were halted by sniper fire. 

The Poles initially armed themselves by attacking Ukrainian 

sentries and by stealing weapons from the patients of an Austrian military 

1 3 
hospital. Polish supply problems ended on November 2, when the lightly 

held freight station, with thousands of rifles and boxes of ammunition, 

was captured. 

As the Poles attempted to enlarge their front, the Ukrainians 

fought back; however, the UHA forces were too scattered to effectively 

repress the Polish insurgents. On the night of November 2, Polish 

soldiers captured the main railroad station which disrupted the Ukrainian 

14 
government's communications with the rest of Western Ukraine. 

During the fighting a crisis developed within the Ukrainian High 
Command; the newly promoted Colonel Vitovsky, realizing that he did not 
have the skills for tactical command, asked to be relieved. He assumed 
the position of War Minister while Colonel Nikola Mar3/novych became acting 
commander of UHA. 

The Ukrainian forces, which had been nearly equal in size co Che 
Poles, began to diminish. Replacements for the casualties were not 
available, while some soldiers, bewildered by the urban streetf ighting, 
began to desert. The only major reinforcement, the Sich Rifle Regiment, 
did not receive orders to move until November 2. Disruptive efforts on 
the part of Polish railroad workers delayed the unit's arrival for two days 

Now strengthened with reinforcements, the Ukrainians renewed their 
attacks on Polish positions. However, the battle went badly for the 



16 



29 



THE FIGHTINGS OF THE THIRD 
OF NOVEMBER 



STATUTE MILL 



Bi-fofiorszaa'S'tJ'' 



\ LEWAND(!)WKA 

\ (Schramm) 



i 





A 



AySlaugnterMouTe 
£// (Ungehauerj 



Aielbrod Mill 



Stractma 
(AtratamJJj Q|d Jew , jh Ce met»ry 

erdinand Barracks 



Central Station 
/Schramm, tareat/t, -i 



i^cnramm. Laveaut, c «>>■<, /\ 

H.liman, KoIom:qws*i) sy^fr ■StJuf / / > 



, ifamt; N 



Hha Palace 



^ Siaumewici Str" l(Siumowskt) 

.'^^j jopiehoSl/Stndarmtnc t* yi 
5 c n h a ;;, k ' N School 0,'H Trv— »->^y SLtaiar.1 EstaUi>h««t 

Magdalene/»»'a;//e'W*/>' 
^ ^Grammar School ♦ Tram Oepot (florid and Maaier) 

\fSaarj 

. HerouH Sir. 




Lviv on November 3, 1918 from Rosa Bailly, A City 
Fights for Freedom: Th e Rising of Lwov in 1918-1919 , 
London, 1555 . 



30 

Ukrainians when their uncoordinated thrusts were met by Polish counterattacks 
on their flanks. The Poles also attacked the Ukrainian positions ac the 
Main Post Office and the Ferdinand Barracks. On November 3, a three-pronged 
assault partially expanded the Polish base in the central city. Later 
in the day, the Ukrainians unsuccessfully hit Polish positions in the south- 
ern part of the city while control of the streets changed several times. 

The Ukrainians planned to mount a general attack at 0600 November 
4, with advance elements of the Sich Rifles and companies of the former 

35th Infantry assaulting the central part of Lviv while another battalion 

18 
moved against Polish positions in the west. Just before the attack 

was to begin the Ukrainian Command discovered that the Poles had occupied 

the Cadet School the previous night. Since the Polish positions on the 

grounds of the Cadet School obstructed the Ukrainian attack, a company of 

the Sich Rifles went to clear it. However, the rest of the force came 

19 
under a crossfire and had to fall back. 

After the unsuccessful Ukrainian attempt, the Poles launched their 

own operations in the center of the city. Their occupation of the 

Ukrainian Seminary, next to the strongly held Main Post Office, gave 

. . 20 „ . . 

tnem an excellent position for future attacks. For a time it seemea 

as if the Ukrainian front would collapse. However, desperate actions by 

small units prevented a breakthrough by inflicting heavy casualties. 

Exhausted by the assaults, the Poles gave way to local UHA counterattacks. 

Also during the day, several aircraft of the recently organized Polish 

21 
Air Force began operations over Lviv by making two bombing sorties. 

On the next day, November 5, Colonel Hryhorij Kossak assumed comroanc 

of UHA. The fighting lasted all day until both sides agreed to a twenty- 



31 



THE FIGHTING OF THE FOURTH 
OF NOVEMBER 



Z AM ARST Y NOW 

(Kotik) 




Lviv on November A, 1918. From Rosa BaiHy* A City 
Fights for Freedom: The Rising of Lwow in 1918-1919 , 
London, 1956. 



32 

four hour truce. The Poles used the time to organize a provisional cavalry 

22 
troop and construct an armored car and crain. The Polish Command 

also planned a commando raid of sorts to capture the Ukrainian High Command 

headquartered in the Ukrainian National Home, however, the operation had 

23 
to be cancelled because of insufficient forces. 

With the renewal of hostilities on November 7, a definite front 

emerged; the Ukrainians held the eastern half of Lviv, while the Poles 

held the western half. After another two days of continuous fighting the 

government became dissatisfied with Colonel Kossak. The government, 

24 
eager for a quick victory, disagreed with Kossak 's defensive tactics. 

On November 9, Colonel Hnat Stefaniv, one of the few Ukrainians who had 

been an Austrian regular, became UHA commander. 

Colonel Stefaniv ordered reinforcements from other cicies, 

changed troop dispositions, and ordered attacks on the Zamartyniv area 

25 
and on the Cadet School. The Poles also launched assaults on UHA's 

flanks, on an armory in the suburbs, and also successfully stormed the 

Main Post Office. These were the last general Polish attacks, several 

hundred casualties and the weariness of the civilians forced the Polish 

26 
Command to go over to the defensive. The Poles were also forced to 

exchange their Austrian weapons for Russian rifles when the supply of 3mm 

. . 27 

ammunition ran out. 

After Colonel Stefaniv successfully repulsed the Polish flanking 

movements, he reorganized the Ukrainian High Command into a General 

Staff, eliminated the chaos in Army Headquarters by banishing civilian 

and military petitioners, and organized military police units to halt 

28 

desertion. One of his major errors, however, was his refusal to enlist 



33 
Ukrainian civilian inhabitants of Lviv to act as scouts, intelligence 
agents, and guides. UFA units, hampered by their unfamiliarity with the 
city, had little information about the size and dispositions of the Polish 
forces. 

The fighting took on another dimension when each side formed 
support units. Both sides organized field artillery batteries that often 
engaged in counterbattery fire. The Poles also organized cavalry, engineer, 
and signal units. While the lone Polish armored car was destroyed after 
two days of fighting, Polish aircraft and armored trains continued to harass 
the Ukrainians. 

On November 15, Colonel Stefaniv launched another general assault 
by making frontal attacks on the northern and southern Polish flanks. 

The attacks failed since Stefaniv did not plan any supporting or diversionary 

29 
actions, nor did he have any adequate reserves. He also ordered the 

third assault on the Cadet School, considering it a threat to his southern 
flank. Another attack on the school on November 17, preceded by two hours 
of artillery shelling, lost its momentum when the Poles counterattacked. 
Exhausted and nearly out of ammunition, both sides agreed to a forty-eight 
hour truce which began at 0600 November 18 . 

During the truce Polish and Ukrainian soldiers mingled with one 
another and discussed the previous fighting. Colonel Stefaniv visited 
each unit and urged his soldiers to continue fighting for Ukrainian indepen- 
dence, and further ordered that commanders maintain discipline in their 

30 
units. While the troops rested, talks aimed at settling the situation 

failed. However, an extension of the truce for another twenty-four hours 

was agreed on. With all hope gone for a compromise, both sides looked for 



34 
more reinforcements. Control of the city would be determined by the 
force of arms . 

The Polish situation was critical. The city had lost its electri- 
city and water supply, while the stores had been emptied of food days 
before. Faced with a food shortage and tired of the constant fighting, 
elements of the civilian population demanded Captain Maczynski make peace 
within three days. Rather than surrender, Captain Maczynski dispatched 
an emissary to Warsaw to plead for more troops. Polish Chief of State 

General Joseph Pilsudski, recently released from a German prison, agreed to 

31 
send 800 men under the command of General Roja to Lviv. At the same 

time reinforcements consisting of 1,368 men with eight howitzers from 

32 
Cracow arrived in Lviv on the night of November 20. Together with 

33 
Captain Maczynski's command, the Poles had over 6,000 men under arms. 

The Ukrainians also did their best to find reinforcements; in 

a general order issued to district and area commanders, Colonel Vitovsky, 

acting as Secretary of State for Military Affairs, ordered detachments of 

troops from all over Western Ukraine to report Co Lviv. He also visited 

34 
several cities and towns in an effort to expedite the arrival of troops. 

On November 21, the strength of UHA in Lviv was 161 officers and 4,517 

enlisted men. 

The Final Phase for Lviv 
At 0600 November 21, the Polish Army began a general offensive; 

its plan called for a pincer movement on the Ukrainian flanks on the north 

36 

and south, timed with a frontal attack on the UHA center. In the north 

the first and second UHA lines were overrun; the third line of resistance 



35 

37 
managed to check the Polish advance. In the city, the Poles failed to 

take the UHA-held Citadel, in spite of heavy mortar and artillery fire. 

However, the Polish movement in the south, which consisted of three infantry 

battalions, an artillery battery, and a cavalry troop forced the Ukrainians 

38 

to pull back. 

At 1100 hours the Poles renewed the assault with air and artillery 
support. Fierce UHA resistance stalled the Polish advance. However, at 
1500 hours, when the Poles made their third and final thrust, the Ukrainians 
held on with the greatest of difficulty. The UHA artillery, which had 
lost its communications with its forward observers, fired at suspected 
enemy locations instead of directly supporting the infantry. In one 
position Polish units captured two howitzers, while other battery positions 

either ran out of ammunition or were destroyed by counterbattery fire. 

39 
3y the end of the afternoon the UHA artillery was out of action. 

Colonel Mtefaniv and his staff did their best to halt the Polish 

offensive; however, Stefaniv, convinced that his army was in a hopeless 

40 
situation, decided to evacuate his troops from the city. On the Polish 

side, General Roja, who had arrived that day with an additional two infantry 

companies, decided to halt any further advances until more reinforcements 

• a 41 
arrxved. 

At midnight the evacuation began and by morning most of the UHA 

troops had left Lviv, leaving large stocks of food, uniforms, and ammuni- 

42 
tion. UHA units took positions outside the city, gradually encircling it. 

The battle for Lviv would now be fought in the villages. 

The 3attle for Peremyshl and the Frontier 
While most of UHA and the Polish Army were engaged in the fighting 



36 
for Lviv, other Ukrainian and Polish units fought for control of the towns 
and cities along the border of Eastern and Western Galicia. The battle 
for Peremyshl turned out to be the most critical. 

Peremyshl, situated on the border of Eastern Galicia and Poland, 
was the major rail link with Lviv and Eastern Galicia. The only Polish 
supply line was the Peremyshl-Lviv railroad. Therefore, without the occupa- 
tion of the city and the capture of the railroad the Polish Command in Lviv 
would eventually collapse without the necessary reinforcements, arms and 
supplies . 

In late October 1918, Ukrainian officers attempted to recruit 
demobilized soldiers for the defense of Peremyshl. In spite of their 
efforts, these Austrian veterans returned to their villages. On November 1, 
Polish troops occupied the city without firing a shot. A provisional 
Ukrainian battalion, which had been disarming non-Ukrainian troops in a 
nearby town, attempted to retake the city but was stopped by a Hungarian 

battalion with supporting artillery. The Hungarians, unaware of Ukrainian 

43 
independence, assumed that the Ukrainians had mutinied. 

Three days later a battalion of Ukrainian irregulars recaptured 

Peremyshl along with an armory that contained 7,000 rifles, thousands 

44 
or unirorms, several cars, and one airplane. However, the Ukrainian 

commander was less than energetic in preparing to meet Polish counterattacks 

and after two days of fighting the Poles recaptured the city on November 11. 

The capture of the railroad bridge over the Syan River, which the irregulars 

had not destroyed, assured the Poles uninterrupted rail service from Cracow. 

With the supply base in Peremyshl securely held, the Poles mounted 

a four-pronged invasion of Western Ukraine. With most of the UHA units in 



37 
Lviv, Ukrainian resistance proved weak. Two railroad centers, Khyriv 
and Rava Ruska, were occupied before hastily organized Ukrainian units 
halted the Polish advance. In spite of Ukrainian sorties, the Poles managed 
to hold onto the Peremyshl-Lviv railroad. Although rail traffic was often 
interrupted, Polish supply trains usually made it through to Lviv. 

The only senior UHA commander in the frontier area who clearly 
understood that Peremyshl was the key to Eastern Galicia was Colonel 
Anton Kraus, a German-Austrian volunteer. Colonel Kraus planned to advance 
to the Western Ukrainian border and recapture Khyriv and Permyshl . The 

second objective of his scheme was to destroy the Syan River bridges and 

46 
then establish a defensive line along the river. 

On December 7, Colonel Kraus and a 900-man battalion captured 

Khyriv. Two days later, with less than 600 men, he attacked Peremyshl. 

Diverting troops intended for Lviv, the Poles fiercely resisted the 

Ukrainian attack. After several days of fighting the outnumbered Ukrainians 

47 
were forced out of the Peremyshl area and later out of Khyriv. Kraus 

could now only harass rail operations along the Peremyshl-Lviv line. 

Operations in the northwest also went poorly for the Ukrainians. 
The towns of Rava Ruska and Yaraslav were taKen by Polish troops from 
Lublin. However, a group (an UHA unit equivalent to a regiment with 
supporting arms) commanded by Colonel Krawchuk managed tc fight its way 
to the outskirts of Peremyshl on December 9. before it was forced to 
withdraw. 

The first several seeks of the war had gone badly for the Ukrainians 
The High Command and several unit commanders had made serious strategic and 
tactical errors that contributed to the evacuation of Lviv and the loss of 



38 

Peremyshl. The change of commanders during the fighting in Lviv resulted 
in conflicting orders, confusion, and lost tactical opportunities which 
ultimately led to the Ukrainian withdrawal. The Ukrainian High Command, 
preoccupied with the Lviv battle, virtually ignored the struggle in the 
west. While reinforcements were sent to Lviv, the commanders in the west 
had to rely on local forces of demobilized soldiers and irregulars. Thus, 
the important rail and supply center of Peremyshl, which should have been 
secured first, remained in Polish hands. The Ukrainian High Command 
believed that once the capital, Lviv, was captured then the rest of Western 
Ukraine would fall into their hands. Therefore, Lviv continued to act 
as a magnet drawing UHA reinforcements and supplies to the detriment of 
the commanders on the western border. 

The Battle for Lviv 
In their search for reinforcements, the Western Ukrainian Govern- 
ment turned to the East Ukrainian Government of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky. 
During the first week of fighting in Lviv two government representatives, 

Dr. Osip Nazuruk and Captain Shukhevich , were sent to Kiev to ask for 

49 
troops and supplies. The Western Ukrainian Government specifically 

requested that the Sich Rifle Regiment of the East Ukrainian Army (a sister 

regiment of the UHA unit) , which was composed of Galician Ukrainians who 

had been Russian POW's, be sent to Lviv. When the representatives were 

told that the regiment was secretly plotting to revolt against the Hetman, 

they asked that only half of the regiment be sent to Lviv. 

Hetman Skoropadsky, wishing to reduce the risk of war with Poland, 

planned to transfer the Sich Rifles to Lviv for incorporation into UHA. 



39 

However, the regiment's officers decided to remain in the Ukraine to 

take part in the revolt against the German supported Hetinan and help 

52 

reestablish an independent Ukrainian government. During these dis- 
cussions, the Hetman sent an infantry company and a military aid mission 

53 
to Lviv, and an infantry battalion to the Peremyshl area. 

Angered by the Hetman' s proclamation that the Ukraine would join 
a Russian federation and by his reactionary internal policies, taking 
advantage of the German collapse, an insurrection led by the Directory 
began in mid-November, and within a month controlled Kiev and much of the 
Ukraine. The Directory, composed of Social Democrats and Social Revolution- 
aries, thought that protection of Western Ukraine's borders was important, 
and immediately made plans to dispatch troops, weapons, and supplies. 
Within weeks 100,000 artillery shells, thousands of Russian rifles and 

machine guns, tons of medical supplies and uniforms as well as $100,000 

54 
in cash were dispatched to Western Ukraine. The troops sent to Lviv 

raised the original battalion to division status. 

The Koziatyn Separate Infantry Brigade, sent to the Lviv area in 
December, would be followed by the Dnieper Infantry Division and an 
artillery brigade, composed mostly of Galician Ukrainians. ~ In addition, 
senior officers of the Directory's army filled UHA positions such as 
commanding general, army and corps chief of staff, and other important 
staff and command positions. Directory railway troops operated and guarded 
the rail lines from Eastern Ukraine. 

On December 10, 1918, Major-General Mykhailo Omelianovych-Pavlenko 
assumed command of UHA and appointed Colonel Evhen Mishkovsky as Chief of 
Staff and Deputy-Commander. General Omelianovych-Pavlenko, an East Ukrainian 



40 
officer born in 1878, was the son of a Zaporozhian Cossack officer and a 
Georgian princess. Commissioned in 1900 after graduating from an imperial 
military academy, Omelianovych-Pavlenko was posted to a Ukrainian regiment 
in the Russian Army. After commanding a company in the Russo-Japanese 
War he served as a training officer and in 1911 attended the Staff College. 
He served as a regimental commander during the first two years of World 
War I. After being seriously wounded, the highly decorated Omelianovych- 
Pavlenko had been appointed chief of staff of the 2nd Guard Corps. His 
next assignment was as Commandant of the Staff College and in the summer 
of 1917 he returned to the Galician front as commander of a grenadier regi- 
ment. After the Russian Revolution he had been commissioned a major-general 
in the Ukrainian Army with command of the Cossack Infantry Division. 
General Omelianovych-Pavlenko transformed UHA from a collection of 
regiments, separate battalions, and irregular groups into a well organized, 
bat tie- hardened army. 

As Commanding General, Omelianovych-Pavlenko ' s primary objective 
was to force the Polish Army out of Lviv. After the evacuation of the 
city, UHA units had taken positions to the north, east, and south of Lviv. 
The Poles retained control of the western approaches as well as the 
Peremyshl-Lviv corridor. 

The Polish position in Lviv had become precarious; constant 
shelling, lack of food, water, and electricity had lowered the morale of 
the civilian population, while the Polish Command thought that the East 

Ukrainian units were the advance elements of the entire East Ukrainian 

57 
Army . 



41 
General Omelianovych-Pavlenko and his staff planned to make a 
major assault on Lviv on December 27. The plan called for three infantry 
groups to sortie from the north and east of the city. While this blow 
diverted the Poles, the major thrust would come from the southwest by 
the Koziatyn Infantry 3rigade. Colonel Kraus's group would cut off rail 
traffic in the west, and then cover the western approaches to the city, 
while Colonel Doluda's irregulars harassed Polish units in the north. 

The UHA units in Lviv consisted of 8,000 infantry supported by eight 

58 
batteries of field artillery. 

The Polish High Command knew the outline of the operation; 

Ukrainian sources agree that, whatever details Ukrainian deserters failed 

to mention, a Polish spy in UHA Headquarters supplied the rest of the 

59 
plans. As a result, Polish units broke off contact on the Khyriv 

front and marched to Lviv. The largest group of reinforcements, General 

Soptnicki's 2,400-mau infantry regiment supported by a squadron of cavalry 

and ten guns, arrived on December 24, in Horodok about 30 kilometers from 

Lviv. 

During the next three days General Sopitnicki's force fought its 

way toward Lviv. On the morning of December 27, Polish units attacked 

the Koziatyn 3rigade and pressed it back with heavy casualties. In 

spite of this setback, the Ukrainian High Command began the assault. The 

northern and eastern advances went well on the first day. However, by the 

second day, when the timing of the Koziatyn Brigade's attack became critical, 

the demoralized East Ukrainian soldiers could no longer continue to advance. 

When General Sopitnicki's troops entered Lviv, the Polish situation 

improved. The UHA advance slowed down and then on the third and final day 



42 




THE VARIOUS BATTLE-FRONTS 



SCALE 

4 6 



i i ■ i ii 



Statute Miles 

LEGEND 

- position of the front in. November f 9 18 
" -> » " >• December 1918 
" " » /» n January 1919 

-front on the 20th of April 1919 



The situation in Lviv November 1918 to April 1919 
From Rosa Bailly, A City Fights for Freedom: The 
Rising of Lwow in 1918-1919, London, 1956. 



43 
of the offensive Polish counterattacks stopped it. 

The Ukrainian High Command now realized chat more troops and 
heavier artillery were necessary for future success. The High Command, 
worried about the possible spread of the declining morale of the Koziatyn 
Brigade to other units, transferred it back to the Ukraine. Planning 
for, yet, another offensive, in early January 1919, began immediately. 

Although the first two months of the war, at best, could be 
called a draw. UHA constantly fought on the offensive. As long as the 
West Ukrainians could retain the initiative, they thought, the sooner the 
Polish Army would be driven out of Eastern Galicia. However, the Ukrainian 
High Command failed to realize that the longer the war lasted, the less 
chance they had to win. It was only a matter of time before a larger and 
better equipped Polish Army could take the field. Meanwhile, the Secretary 
of War issued orders for the mobilization of Ukrainian men between the ages 
of 18 and 35. Plans were also made for a 100 , 000-man army. But it remained 
unclear hew long Western Ukraine, with a Ukrainian population of three 
million, could continue to resist, even with the aid of Eastern Ukraine, 
engaged in its own life or death struggle with the Bolsheviks and Whites, 
the larger and better supported Polish state. 

The 1919 Winter Campaign 
Although the Paris Peace Conference had discussed the Ukrainian- 
Polish conflict over Eastern Galicia, the Ukrainian High Command decided 
that success en the battlefield was the key to diplomatic success in Paris. 
With this goal in mind, General Omelianovych-Pavienko and his staff continued 
to plan offensive operations; the battle for Lviv would go on. 



44 
While the Ukrainian High Command planned an offensive, so did the 
Polish High Command. The Polish plans were tc secure the railroad between 

Peremyshl and Lviv, and Yaroslav-Rava Ruska-Lviv, following that, the 

63 

Poles would then push UHA trom Lviv as far as possible. 

The Polish offensive began on January 6, 1919, with Group Byh, 
under the command of General Jan Romer, marching south from Rava Ruska 

toward Lviv. Two days later the Polish units ran into elements of the 

64 
newly organized UHA I Corps and fell back after a brief but fierce action. 

Polish columns from Lviv, attempting to link up with Romer, were also 

forced back, while another column, advancing from the west along the 

Peremyshl- Lviv railroad, was also stopped. However, several days later 

General Romer ' s force attempted another breakthrough to Lviv which proved 

successful . 

The Ukrainian High Command's plan for the offensive was similar 

to the last attack, this time, however, UHA forces included 16,000 men 

supported by eight artillery batteries. After an artillery barrage, 

the UHA battalions launched a frontal attack on the north and east. The 

Sich Rifles and the 3rd Brigade reached their objective; however, the 2nd 

Brigade, which had to attack the most fortified part of the Polish line, 

was bloodily repulsed. The 4th Brigade's attack from the east was also 

unsuccessful. Later in the day, two Polish battalions made a counterattack 

on two companies of the 7th Brigade, near the village of Burativ. After 

a spirited three-hour firefight the UHA companies abandoned the village, 

after inflicting such casualties chat the Polish battalions could no longer 

advance. However, the gains made on the first day of the battle had been 

far short of the Ukrainian High Command's expectations, in two areas they 

had actualiv lost terrain. 



45 
The next day, January 12, went little better, the Polish tactical 
plan, to beat off the UHA attacks, and then counterattack, resulted in the 
UHA advance bogging down. On the final day of the offensive the Polish 
Army took the initiative by launching several counterattacks. Two 
battalions of the 2nd Brigade under heavy attack broke, leaving an exposed 

flank. The brigade commander rallied his men and recaptured the lost 

68 

ground. The Sich Rifles easily turned back a Polish advance in the north. 

After two successive defeats, the Ukrainian High Command decided 
that new plans had to be formulated, units reorganized, and officers 
reassigned. The tactical plan to take Lviv had to be totally revised. 
Mass frontal assaults had proven ineffective. The war had become less 
positional and more one of movement with troops maneuvering in the large 
open areas of Western Ukraine. Many of the officers and men had never 
fought in open mobile operations, most were used to the trench type warfare 
of the Italian front. The UHA soldiers were also tired, many had recently 

returned from several years of fighting in Italy only to be thrust back 

69 
into the constant fighting in and around Lviv. 

General Omelianovych-Pavlenko and his staff decided to continue 

their strategy of taking Lviv but with one major change; Peremyshl would 

70 
also be attacked. Therefore, the next three months of fighting would 

involve operations to take Lviv and Peremyshl. The northern front would 

become a minor theater of the war, the Ukrainian High Command considering 

it unimportant and garrisoned it with second line troops. The western 

front around Peremyshl received additional troops and supplies and became 

a major campaign. The High Command had finally realized that Peremyshl 

was the key to the capture of Lviv and eventual victory. 



46 
General Omelianovych-Pavlenko approved a plan to reorganize UHA 
into an army consisting of three corps of twelve brigades. During the 
next three weeks the army reorganized, only minor actions were undertaken 
by rotating battalions so that the entire army did not withdraw from the 

front. At the same time these actions tightened the ring around Lviv, 

72 
took enemy held areas of the city, and secured the flanks. 

Certain supply problems also had to be corrected. UHA was rearmed 

with Russian weapons as ammunition for their Austrian weapons had run 

out. Artillery as well as aircraft, trucks, and armored trains arrived. 

Support troops such as engineers, signal corps personnel, and mechanics 

had to be recruited and trained. Munitions were purchased from Czechosiova- 

73 
kian exchange for crude oil from the Drohobych-Boryslav oil fields. 

Although the two previous offensives for Lviv were unsuccessful, 

the Ukrainian High Command felt that with the reorganization, and the 

growth of the army to 60,000 men, that a late winter campaign would be 

74 
successful. The staff had also realized that as the Polish Army grew 

in strength and size, chances for a Ukrainian victory would diminish. 

While UHA planned for a new offensive, the governments of Eastern 

and Western Ukraine united on January 22, 1919. Eastern Galicia, now 

designated as the Western Province of the Ukrainian Peopla's Republic, 

retained internal and external autonomy. Therefore, the union of the two 

Ukrainian republics was "more nominal than real and enabled two different 

75 
and at times contradicting external and internal policies to develop." 

Western Ukraine maintained its own foreign ministry while the UHA, nominally 
under the Directory's General Staff, operated within the previously estab- 
lished chain of command. Even though, East Ukrainian troops were fighting 



47 
Poles in Volhynia, the Directory refused to declare war on Poland; nothing 
would deter it from vigorously pressing its war with the Bolsheviks. 

In preparation for the next offensive, new troop dispositions 
were made with the I Corps on the northern flank, II Corps in the center 
around Lviv, and the III Corps on the southern flank. While most of the 
front was quiet except for occasional skirmishes and artillery duels, 
units of the I Corps fought Polish units for control of the northern towns 
of Uhniv and Belz. After one of the fiercest battles of the war , both 
towns were captured by the Poles on January 29. In spite of several UHA 
counterattacks, the towns remained in Polish hands. 

Within days of this attack, the Ukrainian High Command was ready 
to launch the Vovchukhiv Operation. The operational plan contained two 
phases; in the first, the III Corps would make the main attack on the 
towns of Horodok and Sudova Hyshnia cutting the Peremyshl-Lviv railroad. 
I Corps would continue their offesnive on the northern front between 
the towns of Rava Ruska and Velz . The II Corps, supported by a brigade 
from the I Corps, would make a secondary attack from the north toward 
Lviv. The second phase of the operation called for the II Corps to capture 
Lviv and then link up with the III Corps in a double envelopment on the 
Peremyshl-Lviv salient. Following the end of this operation. UHA would 

be in position to take Peremyshl and force the Polish Army completely cut 

-j-j 
of Eastern Galicia. Both the government and the High Command were confi- 
dent of the success of the operation. The Secretary of Military Affairs 

7 R 

promised General Omelianovych-Pavlenko an additional 10,000 troops. 

The offensive began en the northern front on February 2. when 
battalions of che I Corps surrounded Belz, and two days later Sokal, while 



48 




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79 
the III Corps began harassing attacks on the Lviv railroad. Colonel 



Kraus, commander of the III Corps, also wanted to attack the town of Khryiv 
which was one of the major Polish points of resistance on the western 
front. General Omelianovych-Pavlenko felt that the units assigned to the 

attack were too weak and that the action might draw off troops from the 

80 
main operation. Therefore, units at this particular point on the front 

were placed on the defensive. 

On February 4, a reinforced Polish battalion with supporting 

artillery left Peremyshl for the Khyriv area. Colonel Minkiewicz the 

force commander, had orders to destroy the UHA forces in the Khyriv-Sambir 

area and then to conduct counterinsurgent operations along the Peremyshl- 

Khyriv railroad. However, this attack and a supporting attack failed; 

the tactical advantage of entrenched lines with supporting heavy machine 

gun fire was well illustrated in the attack on Chujok where two UHA companies 

8 1 
successfully defended the town against two Polish battalions. 

After several weeks of preparation, the main attack on the Peremyshl- 

82 
Lviv salient was set for the morning of February 15. The Ukrainian High 

Command had infiltrated intelligence agents into Warsaw and Lviv in order 

go 

to find out Polish military strength and troop dispositions. Newly 
organized UHA batteries of medium and heavy artillery were in support, 

as were three air corps squadrons. An armored car squadron and three 

84 
armored trains, that resembled land-going destroyers, were also in support. 

The first day of the attack went well; a number of villages in the 

Horodok-Sudova Vyshnia area were captured along with 350 Polish soldiers, 

8 S 
22 machine guns, and 6 howitzers. As operations on the northern rront 

renewed, the offensive on Lviv also began. As the assault increased in 



50 

intensity and scope, UHA units steamr oiled over the Polish Army positions. 
Within three days, the first phase of the Vovchukhiv Operation had succeeded 
when the railroad between Horodok and Sudova Hyshnia fell to UHA units, 
thus cutting Lviv's supply line. 

The second phase of the operation, the II Corp's general attack on 
Lviv, started off well. However, the Ukrainian High Command did not press 
the attack with any great vigor. On Febrrary 18, the High Command received 
a telegram from the Allied commission, later known as the Berthelemy 
Commission, of the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference, requesting 

that hostilities cease while the commission travelled to Lviv. The High 

86 

Command initially ignored the telegram. 

The Ukrainian High Command, surprised at its own success, grew 

cautious and ordered the brigade that was maneuvering toward Peremyshl 

87 
to halt, while it confined the offensive on Lviv to the suburbs. The 

Polish Army, in defensive positions since early February, made its first 

major counterattack, retaking the town of Vovchukhiv on the 19th. The 

fighting intensified on all fronts with villages exchanging hands several 

times. Polish supply trains managed to break through to Lviv, while on 

the 22nd, the Poles launched another major counterattack to the west of 

Horodok. After a day-long battle, with heavy shelling by armored trains 

and medium artillery, the Poles were finally pushed back to their original 

89 

positions. UHA's drive to the west halted while the Polish Army fought 

back furiously. 

As the fighting intensified, diplomatic efforts on the part of the 
Berthelemy Commission to stop the fighting increased. On February 28, UHA 
agreed to a temporary ceasefire while negotiations for a truce line began. 



51 










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52 
However, hostilities renewed on March 3, when the Western Ukrainian 
Government rejected a proposed truce line that would have given Poland a 
third of Eastern Galicia. 

The next several days of fighting proved inconclusive. However, 

on March 5, UHA artillery destroyed an ammunition dump in Lviv resulting 

90 

in the leveling of several buildings and causing numerous fires. The 

resulting chaos threw the Polish garrison into confusion. The Polish 
positions, manned by militiamen, were quite vulnerable but the High Command 
failed to take advantage of the situation by not attacking. 

The Ukrainian High Command now decided to consolidate its tenuous 

hold on the Lviv railroad by attacking the town of Horodok. The new plan 

91 
called for the III Corps to capture the town and then advance to Lviv. 

Meanwhile, the Polish brigade at Vovchukhiv advanced toward Sudova Vyshnia 

but was driven back. Instead of following up this success, the III Corps 

turned toward their original objective of Horodok. 

The attack began on March 8, with the unique capture of a Polish 

92 
armored train by a troop of UHA cavalry. The battle for Horodok lasted 

for several days with the Poles fighting a desperate holding action while 

waiting for reinforcements. In the west, a new Polish brigade from Peremyshl 

arrived in the vicinity of Sudova Vyshnia and immediately attacked UHA 

positions, and on March 13, the Poles pushed the Ukrainians out of the 

93 

area . 

When the Polish units from Lviv began an offensive on the UHA 
positions in Horodok, the Ukrainian High Command realized the tactical 
error of the III Corps commander in not holding Sudova Vyshnia. With both 
of these towns in their possession UHA could have disrupted rail traffic 



53 

to Lviv and starved it into submission, and the link up of the III Corps 

94 
with the II Corps would have encircled Lviv. 

The position of the III Corps around both towns was precarious. 
Reinforced by the Poznan brigade, the Polish Army inflicted so many 
casualties on the UHA brigade opposing it during an attack from Sudova 
Vyshnia, that the brigade was later disbanded. In spite of UHA reinforce- 
ments from the II Corps, the Poles recaptured Horodok on .larch 19. While 
another Polish force under the command of General Aleksandorowicz, turned 

north to Yavoriv and forced the 10th Brigade and the Doluda Division 

95 
of the I Corps to retreat. 

On March 22, General Omelianovych-Pavlenko and General Rozwadowski, 

commander of the Polish Eastern Front, both received telegrams from the 

Supreme Council in Paris requesting that hositilities cease while another 

commission headed by General Louis Botha attempted to negotiate an armis- 

96 
tice. General Omelianovych-Pavlenko accepted the cease-fire immediately 

but the Polish High Command did not order one for several days until 

pressed by Major-General Francis Kernan, the American military advisor to 

the Paris Peace Conference, who was on assignment in Warsaw. 

Thus, the UHA winter campaign ended in another setback. Although 

several major operational errors had occurred in the November battle for 

Lviv, UHA could have taken the city had the High Command been more tenacious 

and confident. With che failure of the December offensive on Lviv, the 

High Command should have realized the inadequacy of its tactics and planning, 

instead they believed the answer was more troops and guns. The Vovchukhiv 

Operation was a sound plan and may have succeeded had the High Command 

vigorously pressed the offensive. At the critical time the advance of the 

II and III Corps bogged down, while their link-up was tenuous at best. 



54 
The failure of the III Corps commander to take Sudova Vyshnia 
forced the corps to fight on two opposite fronts at the same time. As a 
result both fronts went into a defense that eventually gave way. The High 
Command, which lacked a professionally qualified general staff, could not 
decide whether to reinforce the III Corps or continue the Lviv operation. 
When it finally decided to transfer units of the II Corps to the Horodok 
area it was a matter of too little too late. 

The Vovchukiv Operation was the high point of UHA's fortune, it 
would never come so close to driving the Polish Army from Eastern Galicia. 
By the time UHA transformed itself from a conscript-war weary veteran 
army into a tough small semi-regular army the massive Polish Army forced 
it out of Western Ukraine. However, the winter campaign forced the Paris 
Peace Conference to recognize the conflict over Eastern Galicia and to 
consider the right of self-determination for Western Ukraine. Militarily 
a failure, the campaign was, at the least, a partial success by placing 
the Ukrainian question before the Western Powers. 



CHAPTER IV 
ORGANIZATION, DIPLOMACY, AND DEFEAT 

Organization of UHA 

During the first two months of the Ukrainian-Polish War the UHA, 
an army in name only, consisted of separate units ranging from bands of 
demobilized soldiers and peasants to battalions of the elite Sich Rifles. 
UHA was similar to other nationalist inspired armies in that organizational 
structure were secondary to the immediate conduct of military operations. 

When General Omelianovych-Pavlenko assumed command of UHA in 
December 1918, it became quite apparent that one of his primary tasks 
was to organize his groups, separate battalions, and regiments into a 
conventional army. Without a disciplined, structured army a protracted 
struggle with the Poles would not be possible. 

The Ukrainian High Command believed that success or failure on the 
battlefield would determine the outcome of the Paris Peace Conference's 
decision whether to award Eastern Galicia to Poland or let it remain 
independent. With a military victory fait accompli the Peace Conference 
would be forced to recognize Western Ukrainian independence, thought the 
High Command. Therefore, a military triumph could only be achieved by an 
oranized, trained army. General Omelianovych-Pavlenko and his staff, as 
professional soldiers, realized this. 

The Western Ukrainian Government, after grasping the fact that 
military success could not come overnight, agreed with the High Command 

55 



56 

that military organization and diplomatic initiatives were connected. 
However, the government pressed the High Command to continue ics operations. 
The Government wanted the best of both worlds; continued fighting and an 
organized army. Omelianovych-Pavlenko had to reorganize UHA during the 
latter part of January 1919. As a result, only the larger formations 
could be standardized. Regrouping of smaller and support-type units was 
carried out during lulls in the fighting. Therefore, the plan for organiza- 
tion was an ongoing process lasting several months. 

In mid -January 1919, Colonel Evhen Mishkovsky, UHA Chief of Staff, 
had his table of organization approved. UHA would be reorganized into a 
tactical army with three corps each consisting of four brigades. There 
had been some thought of an army of six to eight divisions, however, due 
to UHA' s serious shortage of staff and field officers the formation of 
division headquarters did not seem possible. 

Colonel Mishkovsky also proposed to make the infantry mobile 
by carrying them to battle in horse-drawn wagons (trucks were considered 
but there were too few available) . Upon entering the battle zone the 
infantry would dismount. As result, advances could be faster and further 
while the troops would be ready to engage in combat immediately. Although 
not a new idea, the assignment of organic mounted machine gun troops, 
horse-artillery batteries, and ground-support air corps squadrons to the 

brigade was an innovation. However, these ideas proved to be too novel 

2 
for the traditional senior officers to adopc. 

Responsibility for UHA was divided between the Commanding General 

and the Secretary of State for Military Affiars. The Secretary, usually 

a senior colonel, dealth with the administration, recruiting, training, 



57 
and logistical matters of the army. To facilitate recruiting and provision- 
ing, Eastern Galicia was divided into three military area commands with 
headquarters in Lviv, Ternopil, and Stanislav. Each area command was 
divided into four district commands which were subdivided into four local 

command areas. The district commands were also responsible for brigade 

3 
depots where recruits were trained, equipped and assigned. 

The Secretary's staff, similar to the Austrian War Ministry, 

contained directorates of infantry, cavalry, artillery, technical troops 

(signal, engineer, ordnance), and supply. Each directorate took charge 

of the training and administration of its particular branch while the 

supply directorate procured arms, equipment, munitions, and rations. At 

first, UHA relied on leftover Austrian supplies but as this source 

diminished, the supply directorate began to rely on supplies from Eastern 

Ukraine. Later, Czechoslovakia became a major source of supply when the 

Western Ukrainian Government began exchanging barrels of crude oil for 

munitions. However, UHA remained short of arms and equipment. The 

number of available rifles, rather than the number of men, determined the 

L 
size of the army. 

The Army School Command and the Rear Echelon Command (later the 

Reserve Army) also reported to the Secretary of Military Affirs. The 

Army School Command included various officer schools, the Officer and 

Non-Commissioned Officers Candidate School, and the Aviation School. The 

Rear Echelon Command operated the line of communication which included 

operation of the supply line, railroads, hospitals, postal services, depots, 

and the command of newly raised infantry units. Also assigned to the 

command were the military police and gendarme units. 



58 
The Ministry of Military Affairs, under the circumstances, did 
an excellent job of provisioning, arming, and training troops. While it 
derived its organization from the Austrian War Ministry with some of the 
red tape that suited the Galician Ukrainian penchant for bureaucracy, the 
Ministry realized that it was a servant of UHA. Colonel Dmytro Vitovsky, 
the War Minister, maintained good relations with General Omelianovych- 
Pavlenko. Unlike the situation in many other armies the situation of 
strained relations, between the War Minister and the field commander, too 
often existed to the detriment of the army. Vitovsky, a former commander 
of UHA, was well aware of the General's problems. 

The War Ministry continued to function until the end of the war. 
Only in June 1919, when UHA had lost most of Eastern Galicia, was the 
Ministry abolished. The Commanding General assumed control of the Reserve 
Army and the schools while many of the administrative functions were 
transferred to the Ministry of War of the Ukrainian People's Republic. 
The Commanding General of UHA served as the commander-in-chief 
of all frontline troops which included Army Headquarters (usually referred 
to as the Ukrainian High Command) , army troops (units directly assigned 
to Army Headquarters), and the three corps. The Commanding General, who 
reported directly to the president, was also responsible for the overall 
direction of the war. In formulating operational matters, plans, and 
strategy he was assisted by his staff, the Ukrainian High Command. The 
High Command served two functions; as a General Staff that served as the 
chief military planning agency for the government, and as the staff of a 
tactical army headquarters. 



59 
The Chief of Staff/Deputy Commanding General headed the High 
Command which consisted of two branches; an operations branch and a 
support branch. The Chief of the Operations Branch directed on-going 
operations as well as planning futures ones. His staff included intelligence, 
communications, ammunition, engineer, transportation, railroad, motor, and 
aviation officers. The Chief of Support provided both staff service and 
logistical support. The adjutant-general, chief chaplain, provost-marshal, 
paymaster, judge-advocate general, surgeon-general, information officer, 
chief veterinarian, and quartermaster-general served under the Chief of 

Support. Also assigned were battalions of engineer, ammunition, maintenance, 

3 
transportation, signal, and railroad troops. (See Appendix) 

One of UHA's greatest weaknesses was its shortage of senior 
officers and professionally trained staff officers. Since the Austrian 
Army promoted only regulars to field rank, the vast majority of Ukrainians, 
who were temporary officers, served during World War I as company grade 
officers. In 1918 none of the four Ukrainian generals of the Austrian 
Army were available for service and the number of regulars who had been 
promoted to field grade proved quite inadequate to fill the various command 
and staff positions of UHA. Many of the reservists and temporary officers 
that might have served in these positions were prisoners of war in Italy. 
The small number of East Ukrainian Army officers assigned to UHA did little 
to fill the gap. 

UHA, thus, had co recruit non-Ukrainian officers. Several dozen 
German-Austrians, Czechs, Croats, Hungarians, and German-Galicians, all 
former Austro-Hungarian regulars, had volunteered for service as staff 
officers. Many had served with Ukrainian regiments of the Austrian Army. 



60 

Several had commanded provisional regiments and battalions until General 
Omelianovych-Pavlenko replaced them with experienced Ukrainian officers. 

Most of the non-Ukrainians served in the High Command while a few served 

9 
on corps staffs. 

The officer corps of UHA, one of the army's few assets, was 
composed of members of the intelligentsia with ideological motives and 
combat experience. But most had not commanded anything larger than a 
company. During the formation of UHA these officers received commissions 
in the same grade that they had held in the Austrian service. Because 
of the shortage of field officers, brigades were often commanded by majors, 
battalions by captains, and companies by lieutenants. Since promotions 
came by merit and experience; it was not until the Spring of 1919 that 
promotions to field rank, along with the first promotion of general 
officers, were made in appreciable numbers. 

The officers had a close rapport with their men. They explained 
to their troops the necessity of maintaining the struggle with Poland. 
Throughout the war the morale of the soldiers remained high. 

The UHA enlisted man, usually a former peasant with previous 
military service, was respectful toward his officers; he proved to be 
brave, well-disciplined, and loyal. During the Spring of 1919, with the 
worsening logistical situation, the UHA soldier stood up to the severe 
test; many went into battle barefoot, ill-clothed, and poorly equipped and 
armed. Although a great many deserted, the majority of the soldiers 
remained at their posts . 

At times it was difficult to motivate the troops, even though 
most of the soldiers realized that they were fighting for an independent 



61 
Western Ukraine. Those who had little nationalistic spirit merely deserted. 

In spite of their proximity to Ukraine, Bolshevik agitators had 
little influence in UHA. The Galician Ukrainian Workers-Peasant Party, 
formed in January 1919, remained a small, ineffective group. Its only 
success was to incite mutiny in the garrison, made up of second line 
soldiers and militia, in the oil producing city of Drohbbich. Otherwise, 
Bolshevik influenced in Western Ukraine remained negligible. 

UHA units were territorial in make-up. Replacements were assigned 
to a battalion composed of soldiers from the same area. Just as in the 
British Army, UHA found that units recruited from the same region fought 
better and maintained esprit de corps . Each territorial battalion was 
assigned to a brigade which had its depot in the same district as its 
soldier's homes. 

The brigade became the standard tactical combat unit with UHA 
usually fielding twelve brigades with a total of 50 infantry battalions. 
For a short time the III Corps consisted of one division and two brigades. 
The 1st Brigade (Ukrainian Sich Rifles) was actually a three battalion 
regiment while most of the other brigades had four battalions. In addition 
to its infantry battalions, the brigade also had a headquarters company, 
a regiment of field artillery, a cavalry troop, and an engineer company. 
(See Appendix) 

The infantry battalion consisted of three rifle companies and 
one heavy machine gun company. When extra machine guns were available 

one rifle platoon in each company was converted to a light machine gun 

12 
platoon. The table of organization for an infantry battalion called for 

32 officers, 1,007 enlisted men, 26 machine guns, 132 horses, and 59 wagons, 



62 

However, the average strength was usually 875 officers and enlisted men. 

13 
The rifle company has an establishment of 4 officers and 186 enlisted men. 

When the Austrian Army vacated Western Ukraine it left behind 

large stocks of weapons. As a result, UHA relied on Austrian arms. 

The infantryman carried the Manlicher M95 rifle and a bayonet, while 

officers were armed with the M7 automatic pistol and the M61 sword. The 

standard machine gun, the Schwarlose M7112, weighed 170 pounds and had a 

14 
rate of fire of 450 rounds per minute. In the Spring of 1919, when 

stocks of Austrian ammunition ran out, UHA had to discard its Austrian 

weapons and rearm with Russian small arms . 

A unique unit in UHA was the Jewish Battalion. Several hundred 
Jews served as individuals in UHA. They identified with the Ukrainian 
cause and served as officers and NCO's. Therefore, UHA officers did not 
consider it strange that a battalion composed of Jews volunteered for 
duty. 

Solomon Leinburg, a former Austrian lieutenant, organized the 
Jewish Battalion in early 1919. Initially it had been formed as a militia 
unit to protect the Jewish residents of Temopil. The battalion volunteered 
for active service and was incorporated into UHA in May. It consisted of 
1,200 officers and men organized into six infantry companies, an engineer 
company, and a signal platoon. After the battalion's initial training it 
was assigned to I Corps and first committed to battle in July. The Jewish 
3attalion proved to be one of the best units in the I Corps and served to 
the end of 1919 when it was decimated by typhus. 

The field artillery became UHA's best equipped and trained branch. 
The artillery, unlike the infantry which started with several organized 



63 
battalions, had to be organized battery by battery and then forned into 
regiments in December 1918 and January 1919. 

Light batteries consisted of between four and six guns while the 
medium batteries had only two guns. Each regiment consisted of three 
batteries of 76.5 mm Ml 7 field guns (sometimes 80 mm guns), one battery 
of 100 mm M14 howitzers, and one battery of 150 mm M15 howitzers manned 
by 600 artillerymen with 525 horses. All the guns were of Austrian 
manufacture. 

Every brigade had one artillery regiment with an additional regiment 
at corps headquarters. A heavy artillery brigade of two regiments was 

assigned to army headquarters. At its peak strength the field artillery 

16 
consisted of twenty regiments. 

The cavalry proved the weakest combat branch. The wide open 
areas of Eastern Galicia, almost perfect cavalry country, made this arm 
vital, however, no tradition of cavalry service existed among the Galician 
Ukrainians that UHA could draw on as opposed to Eastern Ukraine where 
Cossack traditions had been preserved in the regiments of the Tsarist army. 

The creation of cavalry units had low priority and the reactivated 
Sich Rifle cavalry squadron remained the only horse unit for several 
months. Major-General Myron Tarnavskyi, II Corps commander, took the 
initiative by organizing and assigning cavalry troops to each brigade. The 
rest of the army adopted this solution. As a result, the cavalry rarely 
played its tratitional role of shock action, but rather, were confined to 
reconnaissance and liaison duties. Uaf ortunately, only in June 1919, did 
the High Command recognize the need for larger cavalry formations when it 
authorized the creation of a cavalry brigade; however, the war was over 



64 

18 
before it could take the field. 

While the High Command initially ignored the cavalry, it devoted 

serious effort to the development of the Air Corps. The UHA Air Corps, 

established in December 1918, by attached East Ukrainian pilots, initially 

19 
consisted of two squadrons and a repair and supply depot. When several 

dozen Ukrainian pilots, formerly of the Austrian Air Corps, reported for 

duty a third squadron was activated. 

The Air Corps consisted of a mixed bag of captured, often worn 

out, German, Austrian, and French (captured from the Russians) aircraft. 

The Austrian Albatross 22 and the Brandenburg 64 were the two most common 

airplanes. The German aircraft were usually DFW, LVG, Lloyd, and Fokker 

while the French aircraft were Nieuport 17C1 and 28C1 all distinguished 

20 
by the blue and yellow roundel of the UHA Air Corps. 

Although the Air Corps consisted of 80 aircraft with plans for 
the activation of an additional two squadrons, lack of spare parts grounded 
many of the airplanes. Within several months the Air Corps had less than 
two dozen aircraft in operable condition. Accidents, worn out airframes, 
and cannibalization contributed to this decline. 

Air operations were decentralized; the 1st and 2nd Squadrons 
supported ground operations while the 3rd Squadron was assigned to army 
headquarters for reconnaissance and observation missions. For much of 
the war the UHA Air Corps maintained air superiority, often strafing 
Polish columns at will. UHA sources claim that sixteen Polish airplanes 

9 9 

were shot down as against one UHA airplane. 

Overall, the Air Corps, because of its small size, contributed 
little to the outcome of the war. The squadrons participated in reconnais- 



65 
sance and liaison duties with occasional dogfights and strafing missions. 
There were only occasional bombing missions as few aircraft were rigged 

to carry bombs. Some pilots resorted to throwing bombs out of the cock- 

.. 22 
pit. 

During the Spring campaign the Polish Air Force virtually eliminated 
the UHA aircraft from the skies. Thus, the Air Corps remained an auxiliary 
rather than an important service. 

The armored service, another new branch, consisted of officers 
and soldiers assigned to armored car companies and armored trains. Each 
corps had a company of armored cars that were used to support the infantry. 
But as the cars broke down and were not replaced, the company's effective- 
ness diminished. UHA also had several armored trains which were, in fact, 
mobile artillery batteries with supporting heavy machine guns. The first 
armored trains were but improvised armor plated flatcars and boxcars. 
Within months, specially made armored trains supported each corps. 

When General Omelianovych-Pavlenko assumed command of UHA, he 
realized that the army could not function without technical support troops. 
He immediately began making plans for the activation of signal, ordnance, 
transport, and sapper and pioneer units. 

Engineer companies were organic to brigades and corps. Signal 
platoons were assigned to brigades and signal companies maintained 
communications for each corps. Corps headquarters also had transportation, 
ammunition-ordnance, quartermaster, and maintenance companies, while army 
headquarters had these units in battalion strength. There were also several 
other support units such as military intelligence, military police, judge- 
advocate general, adjutant-general, information-propaganda, medical corps, 
and veterinarian corps. 



66 

The intelligence branch remained weak; only six trained intelli- 
gence officers served in the entire army. Unlike most European armies 

where intelligence officers served on battalion staffs, in UHA, intelli- 

23 
gence officers were posted only at corps and army level. As a result, 

intelligence and reconnaissance missions were additional duties for other 

staff officers. In addition to its police and guard duties, the military 

p lice also performed counterintelligence functions. Military police 

units existed at brigade and higher levels. 

The judge-advocate and adjutant-general were supported by their 

branch troops at corps and army level. There were also 79 chaplains 

24 
assigned from battalion to army level. The information-propaganda 

service served the important function of keeping the army informed and 
motivated. At corps and army level the information-propaganda detachment 
consisted of military history, information, newspaper, and library sections. 
The newspaper section published corps newspapers; "The Cossack's Voice" 
of the I Corps being the most notable, while "The Rifleman" was distri- 
buted army-wide. The library section maintained a lending library of 
books dealing mostly with Ukrainian history. Although a third of the 
soldiers were illiterate, the newspapers and books proved to be popular 
wxth the troops. 

The information-propaganda service's primary purpose was to operate 
an internal troop information program. Booklets, similar to the US Army's 
"Why We Fight" series of World War II, explained the army's purpose in 
the war. All of the soldiers knew that they were fighting to preserve 
Western Ukraine's independence. The service tried to counter the almost 



67 
overwhelming Polish propaganda effort. In spite of its name, the service, 
because of its small size, spread very little propaganda among the peasantry 
and Polish civilians, confining its efforts to its own troops. 

The army medical department, consisting of the medical and 
veterinary corps, was initially well organized and equipped. Medical 
platoons, under the supervision of a doctor, were assigned to brigades, 
while some battalions also had attached surgeons. Field hospitals were 
located at corps and army level while general hospitals functioned in the 
rear. During battles, hospital trains operated close to the front. There 
were also several sanitation units. 

The medical corps consisted of 121 doctors and 102 medical students 
with several hundred nurses, orderlies, and medics. Since there was a 

shortage of doctors several dozen non-Ukrainian medical officers were 

.26 
accepted for service. 

The medical department resembled the Austrian service since many 
of the doctors had served in it. Overall the quality of medical care 
was good. However, toward the end of the war, when the supply system broke 
down, medical care deteriorated due to the lack of medical supplies. The 
quality of medical care and the number of battle causalties directly 
influenced the size of the army. 

At its peak strength, in March 1919, UHA numbered 126,000 officers 
and men, within two months its strength dropped to 54,636 but in June, 
it increased to some 66,000 men. These numbers included the frontline 
troops, reserves, support troops, trainees and draftees en route to 
training centers. 



68 



Frontline strength of UHA in March 1919, was 69,000, in April 



27 

it dropped to 37,967, and in June 25,000. Most of the losses were due 

to desertion, sickness, and battle casualties. Several thousand draftees 
and volunteers were also released when the supply of rifles ran out. 

During the Chortkiv offensive in June 1919, cadres for eight new 

brigades were organized with assignment to the IV and V Corps. However, 

28 
these new units were soon broken up and the troops used as replacements. 

In comparison, the total strength of the Polish Army in February 
1919, was 156,057, in June 278,772, in July 379,390, and in August 518,284. 
The Polish Army grew in size because it had a stable internal area where 
it could organize, whereas, UHA had no secure rear area where troops could 
be trained and units formed. Perhaps, the greatest reason for the Polish 
Army's increase in strength was because the Allied military aid mission 
provided huge stocks of weapons, uniforms, and equipment. In fact, the 
Allies equipped and trained complete Polish divisions. Poland, with a much 
larger population than Western Ukraine, also had thousands of experienced 
regular officers. Service as an officer in either the Austrian or the 
Russian armies was a traditional career for a young Pole. 

UHA, as in the case of other similar forces, had numbers of 
"summertime soldiers." When the tide of war favored the Ukrainians, UHA 
units were up to strength, during periods of retreat, large numbers of 
soldiers melted away. 

It is evident that as UHA grew better organized it declined in 
numbers. Instead of a mass conscript army, UHA became a smaller semi- 
regular army that relied on a core of battle-hardened veterans. UHA could 



69 

not maintain its strength while fighting a fairly large scale conventional 
war. Successful organization meant adopting a type of war that UHA could 
not win. As the Polish Army grew increasingly sophisticated, UHA began 
fighting a rearguard action. 

As military victory became more remote, UHA's fate hinged on 
diplomatic gains in Paris. While UHA was successful and a threat to 
Poland, Ukrainian repr sentatives had powerful chips. However, once it 
was evident that Ukrainian resistance in Eastern Galicia was about to 
collapse, the Allies turned their attention to Poland. Only as long as 
UHA was a powerful military force was Western Ukrainian independence a 
viable alternative. By late Spring 1919 hope of a military solution had 
declined among Ukrainians and it seemed that the destiny of Western 
Ukraine rested in Paris rather than with UHA in the field. 

The Diplomatic Front 
Western Ukraine's attempts to achieve political recognition began 
almost immediately with independence; on October 26, 1918, in a telegram 
to Woodrow Wilson, President Petrushevich informed the American Government 

of the formation of the Western Ukrainian Republic and outlined its 

30 

policies and goals. A second communication, sent several weeks later, 

asked President Wilson to intervene and arbitrate the dispute between 

Western Ukraine, Poland, Rumania, and Hungary, the latter states threatening 

31 

Western Ukraine's right to self-determination. 

The Polish National Committee in Paris attempted to gain Allied 

support by claiming that German and Austrian machinations, with the aid 

,32 

of the Ukrainians, were obstructing "the unification of the newborn Poland. 



70 
Roman Dmowski, President of the Polish National Committee, although 
admitting that Eastern Galicia was "disputed territory," stated, before 

the Supreme Council, that "the Ukrainians might be entitled to home 

33 
rule but they were unable to create a separate state." ' He called the 

Western Ukrainian Government an organized anarchy. In a memorandum 

submitted to the Supreme Council, Dmowski added that Eastern Galicia had 

been part of Poland for over five hundred years, and was important 

because of its natural resources and that its border allowed Poland and 

34 
Rumania to become neighbors. Petrushevich replied by protesting the 

35 
Polish invasion and calling the Polish statements slander and lies. 

With the exception of the French none of the Allied powers were 
well prepared to deal with the intricacies of the Polish-Ukrainian question 
and the French, owing to their sympathy for Poland, were hardly objective. 

In January 1919, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George and 
President Wilson agreed that both the Poles and the Ukrainians should 
stop fighting. The Supreme Council called for both sides to cease 
hostilities while an Allied mission attempted to negotiate an armistice. 
However, each of the Allies had already formed opinions about the situation 
in Eastern Galicia; the French wanted Eastern Galicia to become an 

autonomous province that would form part of a Polish-Rumanian buffer 

37 
between Bolshevik Russia and Western Europe. The United States, at first 

divided between the incorporation of Eastern Galicia into Poland or into 

a Ukrainian state, decided on the former solution. The Italians sided with 

TO 

Poland while the British sympathized with the Ukrainians. 

The French and British members of the Allied Commission, known as 
the Berthelemy Commission, were poor choices for their task of mediation. 



71 
General Marie-Joseph Berthelemy and Brigadier Adrian Carton de Wiart 
headed the respective military aid missions to Poland; both were strongly 
pro-Polish. In their first meeting with General Omelianovych-Pavlenko 
on February 22, 1919, UHA was given five minutes to accept the mission's 
armistice proposal or else be faced with a conflict with the Entente. 
General Omelianovych-Pavlenko explained that he was not authorized to 

negotiate for the government but that a truce could be arranged so that 

39 

the mission and representatives of the Ukrainian Government could meet. 

Three days later, the Ukrainian delegation met with the Allied 
mission. During the first day of talks, the Allies stated that they 

wanted the Ukrainian and Polish delegations to negotiate an armistice 

40 
line, failing that, the mission would dictate terms for an armistice. 

Later that evening, the Polish and Ukrainian delegations met. The Polish 
representatives proposed that the Zbruch River, the traditional border 
between Eastern and Western Ukraine, be designated as the truce line. 
The Ukrainians, who held nearly all of Eastern Galicia, proposed that the 
Syan River, the border of Western and Eastern Galicia, be designated as 
the demarcation line. The talks broke off when the Ukrainians rejected 
the final Polish compromise; an offer for a third of Eastern Galicia. 

On February 28, the Allied representatives presented their solu- 
tion along with a warning to the Ukrainian delegation that a rejection 
would result in the Allies sending the Haller Army (a Polish army consis- 
ting of six divisions trained and equipped by the French for service against 

41 
the Bolsheviks) to Eastern Galicia. The proposed armistice line gave the 

Poles a third of Eastern Galicia including Lviv and the Drohobych-Boryslav 

oil fields. 



72 
The Ukrainians, in the middle of a successful offensive, rejected 
this proposal. The government needed crude oil to buy arms from Czechoslo- 
vakia while any thought of surrendering the traditional capital, Lviv, 
was abhorrent. The Western Ukrainian Government notified the Supreme 
Council of its decision but further requested that a new more impartial 
commission be sent to Eastern Galicia. 

On March 19, Dr. William Lord, the American member of the Berthelemy 
Commission, recommended four proposals to the Supreme Council: (1) that 
the Conference order the belligerents to cease hostilities, (2) that the 
armistice be based on the current military situation but in any case 
Lviv would remain in Polish hands along with the Peremyshl-Lviv railroad, 
(3) that both Poland and Western Ukraine should send delegations to the 
Conference, and (4) that the final armistice line be determined by an 

interallied commission after consultation with both sides and presented to 

42 
the Conference as a basis for mediation. 

Also involved in the discussion was the larger question of the 

Russian problem. Marshal Ferdinand Foch, the Supreme Allied Commander, 

advocated Allied intervention in Russia with an Allied force landing in 

Odessa to join with a Polish-Rumanian army. Foch believed that the conflict 

in Eastern Galicia was connected with the Bolshevik menace. Haller's Army 

must be sent to Eastern Galicia to plug the gap on the eastern front 

caused by the Ukrainians. Lloyd George adamantly opposed the Marshal's 

plan, calling it an eventual invasion of Russia under the guise of relieving 

43 
Lviv. Thus, the Conference was temporarily sidetracked by the question of 

"anti- or pro-interventionist policies rather than on the intrinsic merit 

44 
of the Eastern Galicia situation." 



73 
Turning to the immediate problem of the Ukrainian-Polish conflict, 
the Supreme Council decided on March 19, to order the opposing generals to 
cease fighting while the Council mediated the dispute. A new Allied 
commission, headed by South African General Louis Botha, was appointed 
in April to negotiate an armistice. Meanwhile, attempts by the Ukrainians 
and Poles to negotiate their own truce failed. 

The Botha Commission met with the Ukrainian and Polish delegations 
during the last few days of April 1919, in Paris. The commission meetings 
were marked by major disagreements between General Botha and the French 
members, General Henri Le Rond and M. Legrand . After meeting with the 
Ukrainians, General Botha blamed the Poles for the continued fighting 
while Legrand defended them. Botha objected to the line of questioning 
by the French members during the meeting with the Ukrainians when they 

accused UHA of recruiting former German army officers and insinuated that 

45 
the Western Ukrainian Government did not control UHA. 

After meeting with the Polish delegation, the French accused the 

British members of phrasing their questions as if the Poles were responsible 

46 
for the fighting. The Polish delegation clouded the issue when they 

accused UHA of being in the process of becoming Bolshevik and that any 

47 
armistice would compromise the security of Poland. In a later meeting 

with the commission, the Polish delegation presented three conditions for 

an armistice: (1) that the Polish Army be allowed to advance and link up 

with the Rumanian Army (a condition that the Ukrainians were unaware of) , 

(2) that the Allies assume control of UHA and order the purge of Bolshevik 

and Austro-German elements, (3) that Poland was to control the oil fields. 



74 
The chief Polish negotiater, Roman Dmowski, also charged the Ukrainians 

with having agreed to a Bolshevik request to allow the Red Army to cross 

48 
Eastern Galicia into Hungary. This charge as well as the charge of 

Solshevik elements in UHA were Polish red herrings. 

On May 8, the commission met with the Ukrainian delegation for 

the last time. The Ukrainian representatives gave two conditions for 

an armistice: (1) a military truce, (2) the armistice line would be the 

49 
Syan River . 

The commission recommended to the Supreme Council that the 
demarcation line leave Lviv on the Polish side while the oil fields remain 
in Ukrainian hands. The line was not to affect the final settlement. With 
some minor modifications the Ukrainian delegation accepted the terms. The 
Poles, however, rejected anything less than the military control of Eastern 
Galicia. With the Bolsheviks in Volhynia, the Poles insisted that the 
military situation demanded their control of Eastern Galicia. 

The commission, unable to force the Poles to accept, referred the 
question to the Supreme Council. Lloyd George, angry over news that the 
Haller divisions were in combat with UHA, accused General Haller of a breach 
of faith as these divisions were trained to fight the Bolsheviks. He 
accused the Poles of using the Bolshevik menace in furthering their 
imperialistic aims. Lloyd George suggested that the Council order General 
Haller to withdraw his divisions. On May 27, a telegram from che Supreme 
Council threatened Marshal Piisudski with a cut off of supplies unless the 
Poles renewed negotiations with the Ukrainians. Piisudski acknowledged 
the telegram but by the time the Haller divisions were withdrawn the current 
Polish offensive had pushed UHA into southeastern Galicia. 



75 
However, within several weeks Che mood of the Council changed. 
Communications from Allied observers and French and British generals in 
Warsaw recommended that the Poles be allowed to occupy all of Eastern 
Galicia. With the Red Hungarian armies in Slovakia and the Bolsheviks 
in contact with the Poles in Volhynia, the occupation of Eastern Galicia 
had become a strategic necessity. On June 25, the Supreme Council authorized 
Poland to occupy all of Eastern Galicia. Poland was to establish a civil 
government while a plebiscite, later determined to be held in twenty-five 
years, would ultimately determine Eastern Galicia 's future. 

The Final Military Effort 

The Poles halted operations on March 27, 1919, in order to meet 
the UHA delegation in Khyriv. The Polish High Command, however, was in 
no mood to negotiate; UHA was to accept the Berthelemy line or else the 
war would continue. The Ukrainian High Command had no intention of accepting 
the Berthelmy line as terms for an armistice. It rejected the Polish 
demands with the hope that a more favorable solution would be achieved in 
Paris . 

UHA also halted its operations while waiting for the outcome of 
the Paris negotiations. The Polish Army, in spite of the Supreme Council's 
request, renewed its advance during the last days of March. The Poles 
mounted minor operations that forced the I Corps in the north and the II Corps 
in the south to fall back. To the east, the Bolsheviks forced Petliura's 
army to retreat westward. 

The Ukrainian High Command had to change its strategy. The High 
Command realized that it could not hold onto the remaining portion of 



76 

Eastern Galicia and still keep the army together. The High Command 
resolved to conserve the army at the cost of giving round to the advancing 
Polish Army. General Omelianovych-Pavlenko proposed that UHA go over to 
an active defense and gradually pull back to defensive positions along 

the Dniester River. He planned a final defensive battle after which UHA 

52 
would continue to fight as a partisan army in the Carpathians. 

General Omelianovych-Pavlenko asked the government to iron out 

its political differences with Czechoslovakia and Rumania with the idea 

that these governments would provide some type of military aid. Plans 

were made to reduce the number of support troops in the rear and transfer 

them to the front. At the same time Otaman Simon Petliura pressured the 

High Command to end its fighting with the Poles so that UHA and the 

Directory's Army could consolidate their forces and drive the Bolsheviks 

53 
out of Ukraine. However, Omelianovych-Pavlenko, now a lieutenant-general, 

and his officers refused to consider Petliura' s proposal. 

By early April, the morale of UHA had seriously deteriorated; the 

troops suffered from shortages of food and supplies while a typhus epidemic 

filled the hospitals. Still it came as a surprise when the UHA. garrison 

and the local militia mutinied in Drohobych. The 3olshevik Galician 

Ukrainian Worker-Peasant Party had infiltrated cadre among the soldiers 

and persuaded them to mutiny by repeatedly calling for an end of all 

fighting. The High Command dispatched its most trusted regiment, the Sich 

Rifles, to put down the mutiny. Yet, this incident indicated that the army, 

once indomitable, showed signs of stress. Strained by mutiny, desertion, 

sickness, lack of food, and under constant Polish military pressure, UHA's 

ability to continue the war was in question. 



77 
While the Ukrainians regrouped, the Polish High Command launched 
a limited offensive on April 19. The Polish Army hit the 3rd and 7th 
Brigades of the I and II Corps, forcing the UHA units several kilometers 

south. On the following day, the Poles struck the 2nd and 3rd Brigades 

54 
sending both units reeling back. During the following week, the II Corps 

was also knocked back, losing several key villages to the advancing Poles. 

Under heavy shelling, the I Corps retreated. The Polish 3rd and 4th 

Divisions maintained steady pressure on the Ukrainians. 

The Ukrainian High Command, aware of Polish plans for a major 
offensive, with the government's approval, proposed another armistice. 
The Polish High Command rejected this overture and continued preparations 
for its offensive. The Polish Command planned to employ two divisions 
of the Haller Army when General Haller, along with advance elements of his 
army, arrived in Lviv on April 30. Although the Entente had stipulated 
that this army could only be used against the Volsheviks, later events 
proved that General Haller was not aware of this stipulation and that Marahal 
Foch deliberately contributed to this misunderstanding. 

Heavy rains temporarily halted the Polish advance. When the 
weather cleared the Polish Air Force regained air superiority and mounted 
a bombing campaign on UHA troop concentrations and depots. The UHA Air 
Corps, outnumbered and outclassed by newer superior aircraft, played a 
minor role in aerial operations. 

In spite cf the morass of mud, both armies renewed operations. UHA 
artillery fire managed to slow the Poles in several areas. The UHA 5th and 
9th Brigades, which fought in muddy trenches reminiscent of the Western 
Front, continued to hold che right flank in the Belz area. 



78 
UHA's condition worsened as losses due to casualties, sickness, 
and desertion increased. The flow of replacements from the rear virtually 
ceased. With the front line strength of the army seriously diminished, 
several battalions were disbanded with the troops and their troops used as 
replacement. Adding to the problem, Polish saboteurs seriously hampered 
rail movement by damaging trains and tracks. UHA, with a 300 kilometer 

front manned by 38,000 front line troops, braced for the expected Polish 

P - . 58 

orf ensive. 

General Haller, now designated as Commander of the Eastern Front, 
planned to strike the Ukrainians in three places: the first phase of the 
offensive involved forcing Petliura's Ukrainian Army out of Volhynia, and 
then two simultaneous attacks against UHA, which would force the III Corps 
to retreat upon the rear of the II Corps. Meanwhile the I and II Corps 
would be tied down by a frontal assault. Thus, UHA could be destroyed as 
an effective fighting force. 

On the morning of May 15, 1919, Haller launched his general 
attack on the Ukrainians. Petliura's army in Volhynia, weakened by 
Bolshevik attacks from the north and southeast, was severely mauled by 
the Poles from the west. General Osetsky's 2,000 man brigade surrendered 
after being completely surrounded while the remnants of the Petliura army 
retreated to the southeast. 

In Eastern Galicia, the I and II UHA Corps bore the brunt of the 

attack. The Poles, with some 50,000 men organized into 57 infantry 

59 

battalions, heavily engaged the UHA center. The III Corps also came 

under heavy attack. With only four battalions to resist the Polish 4th 
Division, the III Corps had to fall back. The unexpected retreat of the 



79 
III Corps created a gap in the left flank. The Poles poured additional 
troops into the breech and forced UHA to retreat to new, hastily organized 
defensive lines. The Mountain Brigade, cut off from the rest of the 
III Corps, had to cross into Czechoslovakia where it was interned for the 
duration of the war. 

On May 17 General Omelianovych-Pavlenko personally organized a 
desperate counterattack on the left flank. Eight infantry battalions 
supported by two artillery regiments advanced toward the towns of Drohobych 
and Stryj. The Poles stopped the UHA advance when it reached Drohobych 
and within twenty-four hours forced the Ukrainian troops out of the town. 

While the II and III Corps fell back, the I Corps, on the north, 
managed to hold on for several more days. However, the I Corps right 
flank became exposed when the Petliura Army fell back, forcing the Corps 
to withdraw. 

When word of the offensive reached Paris, President Wilson and 
Prime Minister Lloyd George became outraged that the Poles had renewed 
hostilities and that the Haller Divisions had been employed against UHA. 
On May 21 they agreed with the reluctant support of French Premier George 
Clemenceau, to dispatch a telegram to Pilsudski ordering him to cease 
operations in Eastern Galicia. 

However, the telegram was delayed by the French for six days 
while the Polish Army pushed the battered UHA out of Eastern Galicia. 
The French, especially Marshal Foch encouraged the Polish demands for 
Eastern Galicia. By the time Pilsudski responded UHA had been defeated. 

With the failure of the III Corps to hold Drohobych, the High 
Command decided to regroup toward the extreme southeastern corner of 



80 

Galicia in a triangle formed by the Dniester, Zbruch, and Zolata Lypa 
Rivers. While the army retreated, further attempts for an armistice 
went on. The High Command and the government also debated the fate of 
the army. General Omelianovych-Pavlenko suggested two courses of action: 
turning the army over to the service of the Entente or else leaving Eastern 
Galicia to join Petliura's Army in its fight with the Bolsheviks. The 
Chief of Staff, Colonel Kurmanovych, and several ministers wanted to cross 
over into Rumania and reconsolidate but this option proved impossible when 
the Rumanian Army marched into the southeastern part of Eastern Galicia 
capturing the remaining UHA stocks of supplies and ammunition. However, 
a fourth option arose: UHA would make one more final effort to recapture 
Eastern Galicia. The chief proponents were President Evhen Petrushevych 
and Major-General Alexander Hrekiv, a Russian officer assigned to UHA 
from Petliura's Ukrainian Nationalist. Petrushevych felt that if UHA could 
recapture Eastern Galicia the chances for a favorable settlement in Paris 
would be increased. The Allies, he thought, would have to recognize 
Western Ukraine as a viable tenacious nation willing to defend its interests 
to the last soldier. He dismissed Omelianovych-Pavlenko, who had serious 

reservations about the proposed offensive, and appointed General Alexander 

64 
Hrekov as commanding general. General Omelianovych-Pavlenko agreed to 

remain at UHA Headquarters to help plan the offensive. 

Although the staff soon came up with what was thought to be a good 

plan, the condition of the army was anything but battle ready. UHA combat 

strength had dropped to less than 25,000 men. Most infantrymen had less 

than twenty rounds of ammunition, while the artillery had less than twenty 

ft ^ 
rounds per gun. The Quartermaster-General even ordered peasants to dig 

for bullets in deserted Russian trenches from the World War. However, the 



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82 
morale of the army soon rose when the troops learned of the offensive. The 
soldiers, tired of retreating, wanted to fight back. 

The first objective would be the town of Chortkiv. After its 
capture UHA would push toward Lviv as the final objective. On June 7, 
1919, General Omelianovych-Pavlenko , during his last day as commanding 
general, ordered two probing attacks toward Chortkiv. UHA units swept 
through the surprised Poles and easily captured Chortkiv along with 
several hundred prisoners, six guns, and 60,000 rounds of ammunition. 
Encouraged by this initial success General Hrekov ordered the offensive 
to begin, I Corps was to capture Ternopil; the II Corps' objective 

was Buchach, while the III Corps would advance along the Dniester River 

66 
toward Stanislav. 

The Chortkiv offensive surprised the Polish Command which had 
written off UHA. In fact, several divisions had been all ready transferred 
to Lithuania and Volhynia. Now orders were hastily issued to recall these 
units. 

The Ukrainian advance continued with the Poles falling back. On 
June 11, Buchach was taken along with several dozen guns, machine guns, 
and a large quantity of supplies. The Polish Command intended to block 
the I Corps advance on Ternopil at Terebovlya. Major-General Myron 
Tarnavskyi took command of the combined I and II Corps while his German- 
Galician chief of staff, Colonel Alfred Shamenek, directed the operations 
for the coming battle. 

The brunt of the Polish attack fell on trie II Corps, however, 

Colonel Shamenek moved the II Corps away from the Polish center toward 

67 
their right flank. The I Corps moved toward the Polish left flank and 



83 
center and in a coordinated counterattack with the I Corps, the Polish 
13th Infantry Regiment was destroyed along with elements of the 36th and 
40th Regiments. 

UHA now controlled the town; however, the Poles rushed in 
reinforcements from Lviv which brought their strength to fourteen battalions. 
Local Polish counterattacks did little to impede the Ukrainian advance. 

3y June 16, the Polish Army continued to fall back, while the I Corps 

69 
marched toward Ternopil. 

The II Corps' next objective was the town of Berezhany held by 
six Polish battalions. On June 16, UHA attacked the Polish positions 
around the town. The next day, the Polish Army, now strengthened by 
several battalions, launched their own attack on the Ukrainian line. 
Fortunately for the Ukrainians, the brigades of the II Corps held their 
positions and inflicted heavy casualties on the Poles. The Polish Army, 
weakened by the assault, abandoned the town on June 20. The Polish 
Command's only plan was to hold its positions as long as possible until 
reinforcements could arrive. 

On the left flank, the III Corps also met with success. A double 
envelopment resulted in the capture of Halich when the Polish commander, 
unaware of the III Corps' rapid maneuver, convinced himself that the 
initial attack was a reconnaissance by irregulars. 

As the army continued to advance, tens of thousands flocked to 
recruiting stations to volunteer for the newly formed IV and V Corps, however, 
only 15,000 men were accepted before stocks of rifles were exhausted. The 
army's drive was supported by the local Ukrainian population; peasants gave 
the army food, civilian doctors volunteered their services, while numbers 



84 

of rear echelon troops deserted their units in order to fight at the 

~j -i 
front. While the Chortkiv offensive was popular with the Galician 

Ukrainians, the leaders of Eastern Ukraine were not happy over it. 

Petliura had been pressing the Galician Ukrainians to accept an 
armistice with the Poles for months. The Eastern Ukrainians felt that 
the primary struggle should be against the Bolsheviks. Petliura was 
desperate for the use of the well organized and disciplined UHA. Under 
Bolshevik military pressure on three sides, Petliura took matters in his 
own hands and sent General Delvig to sign an armistice for the Ukrainian 
People's Republic as well as for the Western Ukrainian Province. When 
President Petrushevich, who had been given emergency dictatorial powers, 
heard of the armistice he disavowed it as did General Hrekiv. With UHA 
units advancing on Lviv, both felt that the final Ukrainian victory was 
close at hand. 

The UHA drive continued to smash piecemeal Polish resistance. On 
June 23, the III Corps reached the Hnyla Lypa River, while brigades 
of the II Corps, after encountering stiff resistance, crossed the Zolota 
Lypa River. The I Corps, on the right flank, occupied the town of Brody 
which was less than 100 kilometers northeast of Lviv. However, by June 25, 
the day the Foreign Ministers at the Paris Peace Conference authorized 
Poland to occupy all of Eastern Galicia, the Ukrainian advance began to 
slow down. If there had been better communications with Paris, UHA would 
have known that to continue the offensive and even resistance had become 
politically senseless. 

Pilsudski, freed of any diplomatic constraints upon his policy 
towards Western Ukraine, assumed direct command of the Eastern Galician 



85 

front with the intention of forcing UHA into the small strip of Eastern 
Ukraine still held by Petliura. 

As UHA began to encounter stiffened Polish resistance it suffered 
its first setback; units of the II Corps were forced to retreat along 
the Svir River. On the northern front, the I Corps fought its way to 
Zolochiv with great difficulty. It was evident to the Ukrainian High 
Command that the Poles were planning a counteroff ensive. 

The High Command continued to press forward with plans for an 
attack on Peremyshilany less than 50 kilometers from Lviv. The II 
Corps, with units from the I Corps, planned its attack on June 28, but 
thirty minutes before the attack, the Poles launched their own assault. 
The 3rd Brigade of the II Corps bore the brunt of the onslaught and tena- 
ciously held on while it inflicted heavy casualties on two Polish divisions. 
By midday, the 3rd Brigade was forced to retreat. The counterattack 
at Peremyshilany signaled the start of the Polish general offensive along 
the entire front. Even though the armies were nearly equal in size 
(Poles 41,000, UHA 40,000) the Ukrainians were outclassed by the better- 
equipped Haller divisions. The ragged, poorly armed Ukrainians were no 
match for the modern, well-armed Polish Army. High morale could not be 
substituted for bullets and shells. 

Within days, UHA went into a general, but orderly, withdrawal 
along the entire front. At this point, the Ukrainian Soviet Republic 

appealed to President Pecrushevich to join in a joint campaign against the 

72 
Poles and Rumanians. In spite of the enticing appeal, Petrushevich 

threw in with Petliura, and on July 4 he ordered UHA to coordinate 

operations with Petliura 's army. The struggle was almost over when General 



86 



The Situation in Early July 1919 




Adapted from Chortikivska ofenzyva , (The Chortkiv Offensive) , 
Munich 1953 



87 
Hrekiv received orders for UHA to cross the Zbruch River into Eastern 
Ukraine. On July 8, the first elements of UHA crossed the river and 
immediately went into combat against the Bolsheviks. 

By the time the Ukrainian High Command, now under the command of 
Major-General Myron Tarnavsky, learned of the decision of the Foreign 
Ministers in Paris awarding Eastern Galicia to Poland, the evacuation 
was in full gear. During July 16-17, some 80,000 UHA soldiers crossed 
into Eastern Ukraine. One war was over and another had just begun. 

The Western Ukrainian Government and the High Command had placed 
extremely high hopes on the last offensive. Both groups felt that UHA 
had had a chance to evict the Poles from most of Eastern Galicia and 
at the same time gain the support of the Allies in Paris. But Omelianovych- 
Pavlenko saw the plan for what it was: a final futile gesture. 

Petrushevich and his government stubbornly believed, in spite 
of all indications otherwise, that the army could defeat the Poles. The 
Polish Army, with a total strength of almost 300,000 men, was a formidable, 
modern fighting force. Even though Poland faced border problems with 
Lithuania, Germany, and Czechslovakia, and with the Bolsheviks in Volhynia, 
its army could still deal with the Ukrainians. UHA stood little chance of 
defeating it. 



CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 

The Foreign Ministers of the Paris Peace Conference awarded 
Eastern Galicia to Poland because they saw Poland as the West's bulwark 
against Bolshevik Russia. Eastern Galicia, along with Volhynia and part 
of Belorussia, would be Poland's eastern defensive border. Therefore, 
the Ministers saw Eastern Galicia as a vital geographical link; Poland 
and Rumania, another anti-Bolshevik country, sharing a common border, 
would form a cordon sanitaire from the Baltic to the Black Sea. 

The Foreign Ministers were more pragmatic than the Supreme 
Council. The Ministers were willing to sacrifice Western Ukrainian 
independence, to the larger and more important problem of stopping the 
growth of Bolshevism. The Supreme Council, still cognizant of the policy 
of the right of self-determination, could not agree to Western Ukraine's 
fate, and therefore, with a touch of hyprocrisy, transferred the matter 
to the Council of Foreign Ministers. 

World War I impeded Western Ukraine's progression toward autonomy 
and eventual independence. In 1918 it did not have all the prerequisites 
for a successful nation. Another ten years of political consciousness, 
education, and maturity would have made Western Ukraine a viable state. 

UHA, the military arm of the state, tried to establish its 
legitamacy while claiming disputed territory. When the hope of military 
success seemed distant, the government's diplomatic representatives in 

88 



89 
in Paris attempted to gain the same political objectives by diplomatic 
action. Clearly, it failed in both instances. 

As UHA grew more sophisticated in terms of organization, it 
began to fight a war it could not win. UHA officers had been inculcated 
by Austrian military training. Novel methods, bold maneuvers, or guerrilla 
actions were alien to them. When Lieutenant-General Omelianovych-Pavlenko 
suggested employing harassing operations, similar to those of his Cossack 
forebears, he found little support either from his staff or the government. 
Yet several years after the war, when former UHA officers formed the 
secret Ukrainian Military Organization, guerrilla warfare was employed 
against the Poles. 

Moreover, the Western Ukrainians were caught in the middle of a 
larger struggle between the Entente and the Bolsheviks. The Allies, 
especially the French, clearly favored the reborn Polish state as an 
important keystone for their cordon sanitaire . French favoritism and 
Polish efforts in Paris eventually led the Allies to reject the Ukrainians. 
Greater Poland would best serve as a protective buffer for the Entente. 
Only a strong Polish state could hold off the Red menace. 

However, Western Ukraine's situation had not been hopeless, 
at least initially. During the first few months of 1919, UHA had the 
ability to capture Lviv and most of Eastern Galicia. Lloyd George, if 
not a supporter of the Ukrainians, was willing to hear both sides of 
the argument. Woodrcw Wilson, although dedicated to Polish independence, 
was also aware of the Ukrainian problem. But General Botha felt that the 
voice of Western Ukraine was drowning in a sea of Polish propaganda. 



90 
As UHA lost one battle after another, Western Ukraine's viability 
to survive as a political entity grew less assured. At a time when both 
the army and the state began to function efficiently, its ability to exist 
in the face of Polish invasions, remained in doubt. 

The Western Ukrainian Government's inflexible attitude toward 
negotiating with the Poles extended to Petliura and the Ukrainian People's 
Republic as well. The Western Ukrainian Province, nominally part of 
Petliura 's government, continued to function as an independent government 
even after its unification with Eastern Ukraine. As a result, Ukraine's 
military resources, hardly sufficient for one front, were divided between 
fighting the Poles in the West and the Bolsheviks in the East. The Western 
and Eastern Ukrainians, divided by almost three centuries, found it 
difficult to compromise. Each side was convinced that it was fighting 
the primary enemy of the Ukrainian state. It was only after UHA was forced 
out of Eastern Galicia, that the Western Ukrainian politicians realized that 
the road to Lviv lay through Kiev. By then it was too late. 

There has been little discussion of the causes for the defeat. 
Memoirs and historical accounts of the UHA campaigns stress the lack of 
leadership at the brigade and corps level for the army's defeat. Other 
Ukrainian authors believe that the breakdown of logistical support ultimately 
led to defeat. As this study makes apparent the causes of the defeat were 
far more extensive. The very nature of the war, into which the UHA found 
itself drawn after the unsuccessful coup in Lviv, placed extraordinary 
demands upon the entire military organization of Western Ukraine. This 
struggle, which involved the UHA in a contest with a better armed, better 
led and better supplied Polish Army, drained the existing military resources 



91 
in Che territories occupied by the UHA. 

In the absence of external diplomatic and military support and a 
safe rear area, where the training of new units and the production of 
domestic arms could be undertaken, the UHA found itself confronted by an 
escalating struggle. The efforts of UHA commanders to create a conventional 
army were frustrated because of the economic backwardness of the region 
itself, the extraordinary pressure under which such organizational efforts 
had to be undertaken and the short period of time during which Western 
Ukraine existed as a political entity. 



92 



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FOOTNOTES 



CHAPTER II 



1 Ivan Rudnytsky, "The Ukrainians in Galicia under Austrian Rule," 
Austrian History Yearbook , III, part 2 (Houston, Texas: Rice 
University Press, 1967), p. 396. See also Martha Bohachevsky- 
Chomiak, The Spring of a Nation : The Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia 

in 1848 (Philadelphia: Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1967), pp. 11-16 

2 Ibid. 

3 Ibid., p. 395. 

4 V. Kubijovyc (ed.), Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia , Vol. i, 
(Toronto: University Press of Toronto, 1963), pp. 698-699. 

5 Rudnytsky, "The Ukrainians," p. 398. 

6 Kubijovyc, Ukraine, I, p. 699. 

7 lb id . 

8 Ibid. 

9 Rudnytsky, "The Ukrainians," P. 400. 

10 Michael Yaremko, Galicia-Halychyna: From Separation to Unity 
(New York: Shevchenko Scientific Society, 1967), pp. 129-130. 

11 Rudnytsky, "The Ukrainians," p. 400. 

12 Ibid., p. 401. 

13 Ibid., p. 403. 

14 Piotr Wandycz, The Lands of Partitioned Poland 179 5-1918 (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1974), p. 256. 

98 



99 

15 Ibid., p. 257. 

16 Kubijovyc, Ukraine , I, p. 702. 

17 Rudnytsky, "The Ukrainians , " pp. 406-407. 

18 Kubijovyc, Ukraine , I, P. 700. 

19 Wandycz, The Lands , p. 258. 

20 Rudnytsky, "The Ukrainians," p. 415. 

21 Ibid., p. 416. 

22 Wasyl Kutshabsky, Die West Ukraine im Kampfe mit Pden Und dem 
Bolschewismus in den Jahren 1918-19 23 (Berlin: Junker and 
Dunnhaupt, 1934), p. 14 quoted in Rudnytsky, "The Ukrainians," 
p. 416. 

23 Rudnytsky, "The Ukrainians," pp. 422-423. 

24 Yaremko, Galicia , p. 158. 

25 Rudnytsky, "The Ukrainians," p. 417. 

26 Ibid., p. 419. 

27 Kubijovyc, Ukraine , I, p. 705. 

28 Rudnytsky, "The Ukrainians," p. 425. 

29 Kann, The Multinational Empire , Vol. II, p. 223. 

30 Kubijovyc, Ukraine , I, pp. 723-724 and Rudnytsky, "The Ukrainians," 
pp. 426-427. 

31 Kubijovyc, Ukraine , I, p. 222. 

32 Ibid., p. 706. 

33 John Reshefar, The Ukrainian Revolution 1917-19 20 (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 19 52) , reprinted New York: Arno 
Press, 1972, pp. 212-213. 



100 

34 Kubijovyc, I, p. 714. 

35 Ibid. 

36 Antin Krezub (Osyp Dumin) , Narys istorii Ukrains 'ko-pol ' s 'koi viiny 
(Lviv: Chervona Kalyna, 1933), reprinted New York: Oko, 1966, 

p. 7. 

37 M. Andrusiak, "The Ukrainian Movement in Galicia," Slavonic and 
East European Review , XIV (July, 1935) (June, 1936) , p. 376. 

38 Ibid. 

39 Yaremko, Galicia , p. 203. 

40 Andrusiak, "The Ukrainian Movement," pp. 377-378. 

41 Ibid. 

42 Yaremko, Galicia , p. 205 

43 Andrusiak, "The Ukrainian Movement," p. 379. 

44 Kubijovyc, I, p. 716. 

45 Michael Lozyns'kyi, Halychyna 1918-19 20 (Vienna, 1920), reprinted 
New York: Chervona Kalyna, 1970, p. 23. 

46 Ibid. 

47 Reshetar, Ukrainian Revolution , p. 115. 

48 Ibid., pp. 181-183. 

49 Reshetar, Ukrainian Revolution , pp. 181-182. 

50 Ibid., pp. 213-214. 

51 Gunther Rothenberg, The Army of Francis Joseph (West Lafayette, 
Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1976), p. 128. 

52 Kubijovyc, II, p. 1063 and J. S. Lucas, Austro-Hungarian Infantry 
1914-1913 (London Almark Publishing Co., Ltd., 197 3), pp. 102-110. 

53 Kubijovyc, II, p. 1063. 



101 

54 Rothenburg, Army , p. 128. 

55 Ibid., p. 193. 

56 Lew Shankowsky, Ukrains'ka Halyts'ka Armiia (Winnipeg: privately 
printed, 1974), p. 34. 

57 Ibid. 

58 Kubijovyc, II, p. 1064. 

59 Lucas, Infantry , p. 49. 



FOOTNOTES 



CHAPTER III 



1 Krezyb, Narys , p. 32. 

2 Oleksa Kuzma, Lystopadovi dni 1918 , (Lviv, 1931), reprinted New 
York: Chervona Kalyna, 1960, p. 59. 

3 Shankowsky, Ukrains 'ka , p. 42. 

4 Krezyb, Narys , p. 33. 

5 Lozyns'kyi, Halychyna , p. 43. 

6 Ibid., pp. 42-43. 

Czeslaw Maczynski, Osobodzenie Lwowa , (Warsaw, 1921), I, p. 185. 

8 Rosa Bailly, A City Fights For Freedom: The Rising of Lwow 

in 1918-1919 , (London: Publishing Committee Leopolis, 1956), p. 61 

9 Ibid., p. 52. 

10 Ibid. 

11 Kuzma, Lystopadovi , p. 91. 

12 Bailly, A City , p. 106. 

13 Kuzma, Lystopadovi , pp. 91, 97. 

14 Ibid., pp. 113-114. 

15 Krezyb, Narys , p. 39 

16 Kuzma, Lystopadovi , p. 137. 

17 Krezyb, Narys , p. 42. 

18 Kuzma, Lystopadovi , p. 141. 

102 



103 

19 Ibid., p. 144. 

20 Ibid., p. 151. 

21 Kuzma, Lystopadovi , p. 146, Bailly, A City , p. 184. 

22 Bailly, A City , p. 189. 

23 Ibid., p. 186. 

24 Kuzma, Lystopadovi , pp. 213-214. 

25 Krezyb, Narys , p. 44. 

26 Ibid., p. 45. 

27 Maczynski, Osobodzenie , I, p. 227. 

28 Kuzma, Lystopadovi , p. 268. 

29 Ibid., pp. 305-306. 

30 Ibid., p. 371. 

31 Bailly, A City , p. 273. 

32 Ibid., pp. 286-288. 

33 Kuzma, Lystopadovi , p. 392. 

34 Ibid., pp. 372-373. 

35 Shankowsky, Ukrains 'ka , p. 24. 

36 Bailly, A City , pp. 288-289. 

37 Ibid., pp. 292-293. 

38 Kuzma, Lystopadovi , p. 401. 

39 Ibid., pp. 407-409. 

40 Ibid., p. 412. 

41 Kuzma, Lystopadovi , p. 419. 

42 Ibid., p. 427. 

43 Krezyb, Narys , pp. 50-52. 

44 Kuzma, Lystopadovi , p. 240. 



104 

45 Ibid., p. 242. 

46 Ukrains'ka Halysts'ka Armiia u 40 - richchnia ii vchasty u 

vyz vo 1 ' nykh zmahunmakh , II, (Winnipeg: privately printed, 1958), 
p. 54. 

47 Ibid., pp. 54-56. 

48 Krezyb, Narys , p. 57. 

49 Kuzma, Lystopadovi , p. 220. 

50 Reshetar, Ukrainian , pp. 215-216. 

51 Ibid. 

52 Ibid., p. 216. 

53 Krezyb, Narys , pp. 111-112. 

54 Ibid., p. 113. 
55. Ibid., p. 112. 

56 General Mykhailo Omelianovich - Pavlenko, Ukrainsko - polska 
viina 1918-1919 , (Prague, 1929), pp. 29-30. 

57 Krezyb, Narys , p. 57. 

58 Ibid., p. 58. 

59 Krezyb, Narys , p. 59, Pavlenko, Ukrainsko , p. 18. 

60 Krezyb, Narys , p. 59. 

61 Ibid., p. 60. 

62 Pavlenko, Ukrainsko , p. 19. 

63 Krezyb, Narys , p. 97. 

64 Ibid. 

65 Ibid. 

66 Ibid., p. 98. 

67 Ibid., p. 97. 



105 

68 Ibid., p. 100. 

69 Pavlenko, Ukrainsko , p. 22. 

70 Krezyb, Narys , p. 100. 

71 Pavlenko, Ukrainsko , p. 27. 

72 Ibid. 

73 Ibid., p. 25. 

74 Ibid., p. 28. 

75 Reshetar, Ukrainian , p. 230. 

76 Krezyb, Narys , p. 103. 

77 Ibid. 

78 Ibid. 

79 Pavlenko, Ukrainsko , p. 31. 

80 Krezyb, Narys , p. 105. 

81 Pavlenko, Ukrainsko , p. 31. 

82 Ibid., pp. 31-32. 

83 Ibid., p. 33. 

84 Ibid., p. 34. 

85 Krezyb, Narys , p. 107. 

86 Pavlenko, Ukrainsko , p. 43. 

87 Krezyb, Narys , p. 108. 

88 UHA War Diary, 19 February 1919, in Pavlenko, Ukrainsko , p. 41. 

89 Ibid., p. 42. 

90 Ibid., p. 51. 

91 Shankowsky, Ukrains 'ka , p. 126. 

92 Pavlenko, Ukrainsko , p. 45. 

93 Shankowsky, Ukrains 'ka , p. 130. 



106 

94 Pavlenko, Ukrainsko , p. 58. 

95 Krezyb, Narys , p. 124. 

96 Pavlenko, Ukrainsko , p. 54. 



FOOTNOTES 



CHAPTER IV 



1 Krezyb, Narys , pp. 15-16. 

2 Ukrains'ka , Vol I, pp. 157-158. 

3 Krezyb, Narys , p. 73. 

4 Ibid . 

5 Ukrains'ka , Vol I, p. 77. 

6 Ibid., p. 362. 

7 Ibid. 

8 Ibid., p. 75. 

9 Ibid., p. 129. 

10 Osyp Stanmir, Moia uchast' u vyzvol'nyh zmahanmiakh 1917-1920 , 
(Toronto: privately printed, 1966), p. 56. 

11 Myron Levytsky, ed . , Istoriic Ukrains'koko viiska , (Lviv: 1936, 
2nd ed . , Winnipeg: privately printed, 1953), p. 522. 

12 Ukrains 'ka , Vol I, pp. 161-163. 

13 Ibid., Vol II, p. 278. 

14 J. S. Lucas, Austro-Hungarian Infantry 1914-1918 (London: Almark 
Publishing Co., Ltd., 1973), pp. 76-84. 

15 Ukrains'ka , Vol I, p. 257. 

16 Levytsky, Istoriia , p. 524. 

17 Ukrains'ka , Vol I, p. 206. 

18 Ibid . 

107 



108 

19 Levytsky, Istoriia , p. 526. 

20 Ukrains'ka , Vol I, p. 219. 

21 Levytsky, Istoriia , p. 526 and Ukrains 'ka , Vol I, p. 228. 

22 Ukrains'ka , Vol I, p. 225. 

23 Levytsky, Istoriia , p. 530. 

24 Ukrains'ka , Vol I, p. 317. 

25 A 1921 survey indicated that one-third of Eastern Galicia was 
illiterate from Adam Zoltowski, 3order of Europe: A Study of the 
Polish Eastern Provinces , (London: Hollis and Carter, 1950), p. 298 

26 Levytsky, Istoriia , p. 531. 

27 Lew Shankowsky, Ukrains'ka Halyts'ka Armiia , (Winnipeg: privately 
printed, 1974), p. 24. An estimate of UHA battle casualties is 
around 15,000 while Polish casualties range around 10,000. 

28 Ukrains'k a, Vol I, p. 605. 

29 Witald Hupert, Zajecia Malopolski Wschodniej i Wolynia w roku 1919 . 
(Lwow: 1928), pp. 12-16, quoted in Shankowsky, Ukrains 'ka , p. 24. 

30 U.S. Dept. of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations 

of the United States, 1919, The Paris Peace Conference , (Washington 
1937), Vol II, pp. 195-196. 

31 Ibid. 

32 Ibid., p. 411 

33 Ibid., Vol III, pp. 781-782. 

34 Piotr Wendycz, France and Her Eastern Allies 1919-1925 , 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1962), p. 105. 

35 U.S. Dept. of State, Papers , Vol II, p. 420. 

36 Ibid., Vol III, p. 416. 



109 

37 Dossier Klotz 14 Memoire, December 20, 1918, Pologne I quoted 
in Wandcyz, France , p. 107. 

38 Wandycz, France , p. 107. 

39 Omelianovyck-Pavlenko , Ukrainsko , p. 67. 

40 Matthew Stachiw and Jaroslaw Sztendera, Western Ukraine at the 
Turning Point of Europe's History 1918-1923 , (New York: Sherchenko 
Scientific Society, 1971), Vol I, p. 16. 

41 Ibid., pp. 164-165. 

42 U.S. Dept. of State, Papers , Vol IV, p. 384. 

43 Ibid., pp. 379-380. 

44 Wandycz, France , p. 108. 

45 Wandycz, France , p. 110, and Stachiw, Western Ukraine , Vol II, 
p. 13. 

46 Wandycz, France , p. 110. 

47 Stachiw, Western Ukraine , Vol II, p. 13. 

48 Ibid., p. 21. 

49 Ibid., p. 22. 

50 U.S. Dept. of State, Papers , Vol IV, p. 781. 

51 Wandycz, France , p. 111. 

52 Omelianovych-Pavlenko, Ukrainsko , p. 61. 

53 Ibid., p. 65. 

54 Krezyb, Narys , p. 128. 

55 Shankowsky, Ukrains 'ka , p. 135. 

56 U.S. Dept. of State, Papers , Vol VI, p. 118. 

57 Shankowsky, Ukrains 'ka , p. 141. 

58 Ibid., p. 144. 



110 

59 Adam Przybylski, Wojna Polska 1918-1921 , (Warsaw: Wo j skowy Instytut 
Navkowo-Wydawniczy, 1930), p. 89. 

60 Krezyb, Narys , p. 135. 

61 John Thompson, Russia, Bolshevism, and the Versailles Peace , 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 191. 

62 Ibid., p. 192. 

63 Omelianovych-Pavlenko , Ukrainsko , p. 68. 

64 Ibid., p. 69. 

65 Stanmir, Moia Uchast ' , p. 79. 

66 Ibid. 

67 Krezyb, Narys , p. 146. 

68 Denik nachalnoi komandy Ukrainskoi halytskoi armii, (Diary of the 
High Command of the Ukrainian Galician Army ) (New York: Chervona 
Kalyna, 1974), p. 7. 

69 Ibid. , pp. 8-9. 

70 Ibid., p. 9. 

71 Krezyb, Narys , p. 149. 

72 Reshefar, Ukrainian, pp. 284-285. 



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UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL 



Royak, Marian. "Polish-Ukrainian Conflict for Lvov and East Galicia 

1918-1923." Unpublished M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1963 



THE UKRAINIAN GAL IC IAN ARMY IN THE 
UKRAINIAN-POLISH WAR 1918-1919 



by 

LEONID KONDRATIUK 
B.A., The Citadel, 1971 



AN ABSTRACT OF A MASTER'S THESIS 



submitted in partial fulfillment of Che 



requirements for the degree 



MASTER OF ARTS 



Department of History 



KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY 
Manhattan, Kansas 



1979 



1 

With the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in October 1918, 
five states emerged: Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Western 
Ukraine. The last, Western Ukraine, had never been a separate country. 
A former Polish province, it was a historic part of the Ukraine. In 
spite of its name, the Western Ukrainian Republic consisted, primarily, 
of the province of Eastern Galicia. The Ukrainian majority had been ruled, 
for years, by the Polish minority. During the confusion of the fall of 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ukrainians took advantage of the situation 
by proclaiming their independence. Poles, both in and outside of the 
country, saw Eastern Galicia as a historic and integral part of Poland. 
The inevitable result was an armed conflict, the Ukrainian-Polish War of 
1918-1919. 

The war was the result of years of political friction between 
Poles and Ukrainians. During the mid-nineteenth century, the Ukrainians 
rediscovered their ethnic and cultural identity. This revival led to 
Ukrainian demands for a greater role in government. However, the Poles, 
who were the landowners and civil servants, viewed the Ukrainian revival 
as an Austrian intrigue. From 1848 to 1914 Ukrainians slowly gained politi- 
cal concessions. In 1914 Ukrainian politicians believed that autonomy and 
eventual independence were in sight. 

However, when World War I ended the Ukrainians attempted to determine 
their own destiny. On October 20, 1918, the Ukrainian National Council 
declared the independence of Western Ukraine. On November 1 Ukrainian 
soldiers seized the city of Lviv . The Polish residents of the city, which 
included several hundred demobilized soldiers, resisted the Ukrainians 



2 
and an armed struggle ensued. The Ukrainian soldiers, loosely organized 
into the Ukrainska Halytska Ariniia (Ukrainian Galician Army, UHA) , attempted 
to put down the rebellion. Both the Polish Army and the UHA sent reinforce- 
ments to Lviv as the battle intensified. However, UHA evacuated the city 
on November 21, intending to fight a more conventional battle outside of 
the city. 

As the UHA encircled Lviv, the conflict expanded into a full-fledged 
war. UHA, organized into a conventional army, attempted to storm the city 
with conventional tactics. However, the Polish invasion of Eastern Galicia 
further expanded the war. While an Allied Commission, representing the 
victorious Western Powers at Versailles, attempted to stop the fighting, 
UHA and the Polish Army battered themselves in a series of offensives and 
counterof f ensives . 

During the course of war the UHA attempted to transform itself 
from a mass conscript force into a semi-regular army. Its leadership 
created an efficient military organization. However, this structure imposed 
upon UHA a type of war that it could not win. In conventional battles of 
attrition better armed and supplied Polish troops drove the now ragged 
UHA into Southeastern Galicia. By the end of May 1919, it seemed that UHA 
was defeated. In a bold, but futile, offensive UHA pushed the surprised 
Poles back to the gates of Lviv. However, the Polish Army, now under the 
command of Marshal Jozef Pilsudski, rallied and with fresh reinforcements 
drove the UHA, once and for all, out of Eastern Galicia. 

As chances of a military victory diminished, the Ukrainian redoubled 
their diplomatic efforts at the Paris Peace Conference. However, events 
in Russia undermined the Western Ukrainian cause. Once the Conference was 



3 
committed to an Anti-Bolshevik barrier in Eastern Europe, the logical step 
was to award Eastern Galicia to Poland. Poland was to be the buffer 
against the Bolsheviks and their possession of Eastern Galicia was a 
strategic necessity. Neither Ukrainian Galician pleas for the right of 
national self-determination nor the UHA's residual military capability 
could alter the geopolitical reality. 

In the absence of external diplomatic and military support and a 
safe rear area, where the training of new units and the production of 
domestic arms could be undertaken, the UHA found itself confronted by an 
escalating struggle. The efforts of UHA commanders co create a conventional 
army were frustrated because of the economic backwardness of the region 
itself, the extraordinary pressure under which such organizational efforts 
had to be undertaken and the short period of time during which Western 
Ukraine existed as a political entity.